
















The Dissertation Committee for Kai Fung Law Certifies that this is the approved 
version of the following dissertation: 
 
 








Laura T. Starks, Supervisor 














Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 









This thesis would not have been possible without the support and encouragement 
of many individuals. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Laura Starks for her 
continuous encouragement and support throughout the completion of this dissertation and 
the job market search. The process has certainly been a road with many ups and downs; 
nonetheless, I feel very fortunate and honored to have had her as a mentor by my side. I 
look up to her as a role model and hope my students in the future will look back and say 
the same to me. 
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my other mentors, Michael 
Clement, Bing Han, Alok Kumar, and Clemens Sialm. All of them have continuously 
encouraged me to develop critical thinking, while at the same time setting no boundaries 
to my creativity, and being a source of motivation and emotional support throughout my 
graduate studies. Their encouragement has helped me to survive this long road of 
completing my PhD. It is a great honor to have had them as my mentors. 
I am also grateful to many other individuals for making this dissertation happen: 
Andres Almazan, Sheridan Titman, and my fellow classmates Nicholas Crain, Irem 
Demirci, Jung Eun Kim, and Denys Maslov. I am thankful for their friendship and 
support during my five years of PhD study. They have always been there whenever I 
needed them. 
Last but not least, I would also like to thank my family for their unconditional 
love and support despite my lack of contribution to the family. I thank my mother for her 
faith and support in me during all these years. I hope that my father would look down 
from heaven with a big smile on his face and feel proud of me. Special thanks are given 
 vi
to my long-term partner, Elaine Chan, for her emotional support whenever I feel 
distressed or depressed. Only her love makes everything possible. 
 vii
Early Career Experience and Optimism Spillover 
 
Kai Fung Law, PhD 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
Supervisor:  Laura T. Starks 
 
Using a long panel on employment history, I exploit a novel setting to examine if 
sell-side analysts carry over their early experience into their future professional careers. I 
find that analysts’ early mentorship experience has a long-lasting impact on their 
professional styles. Analysts are more optimistic if they work with optimistic mentors in 
their first jobs as junior analysts: they issue more strong buy recommendations and 
upgrade jumps, and they are also more optimistic in earnings forecasts and price targets. 
While it is easy to pick up their mentors’ styles, I show that it is apparently harder for 
them to learn their mentors’ skills, as indicated by the lack of spillover in forecast 
accuracy. Only talented superstar mentors can unwind this pattern, passing their skills 
and reputation to their protégés. The market — especially sophisticated institutional 
investors — is smart in identifying the apprentices of optimistic mentors as short-run 
market reactions to their forecast revisions are weaker. Collectively, these results have 
important implications for financial economists and regulators (on a new source of 
optimism), for analyst profession (on talent management and portability), and for market 
participants (on information dissemination). 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Do individuals’ past experiences affect their future economic behaviors? While 
traditional economic and finance theories assert that individuals are rational, an 
increasing number of economic and finance studies have shown that individuals’ past 
experiences have a long-lasting impact on their future personal, or even professional, 
decision making. 
This dissertation uses the sell-side analyst profession as a setting to answer 
whether individuals carry their past experiences into their future decision making. More 
specifically, the following chapters attempt to shed light on the extent to which analysts’ 
styles and skills are influenced by their early mentorship and labor market experience 
when they first start their analyst jobs. 
Following the literature review in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 first examines whether 
sell-side analysts’ optimism and skills are influenced by their early career mentors, which 
are defined as those colleagues who work in the same brokerage house (i.e., same house), 
cover the same sector (i.e., same team), and have more years of professional experience 
(i.e., veteran) during analysts’ early careers as junior analysts. The major findings are 
summarized as follows. First, analysts are more optimistic (pessimistic) in their future 
professional careers if they work with optimistic (pessimistic) mentors in their early 
careers. More specifically, analysts with optimistic mentors issue more strong buy 
recommendations and upgrade jumps, and are more optimistic in earnings forecasts and 
price targets. 
While there is a spillover in optimism, there is no spillover in accuracy. In other 
words, while it is easy for analysts to pick up their mentors’ styles, it is apparently harder 
for them to pick up their mentors’ skills. Only talented superstar mentors (i.e., all-star 
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analysts) can break this pattern, spilling their forecasting skills to their protégés. What is 
more intriguing is that, controlling for accuracy, optimism, brokerage size, analyst 
characteristics (i.e., general experience, firm-specific experience), or portfolio complexity 
(i.e., number of companies, number of industries), analysts with all-star mentors in their 
early careers are almost 6% more likely to be elected as all-star analysts than analysts 
with no star mentors. 
Chapter 4 broadens the analysis to ask the following questions: does the market 
care about the mentors of optimistic analysts? And is every market participant able to 
take this mentor-mentee relationship into account when digesting analysts’ forecast 
revisions? The results indicate that the market generally responds more weakly to the 
revisions made by analysts who have optimistic mentors. More specifically, the evidence 
shows that sophisticated institution investors substantially discount the revisions made by 
the protégés of optimistic mentors, regardless of the direction of revisions. In short, the 
market is smart enough to identify the analysts of extremely optimistic mentors and 
discounts their revisions. 
Finally, using the cyclical labor market as a form of exogenous shock, in Chapter 
5 I exploit a novel setting to examine if sell-side analysts differ in their style and skills 
depending on their early career macroeconomic environment. This paper shows that 
analysts who start their careers in a tough labor market are more pessimistic, less 
accurate, and less likely to become all-star analysts than their non-recession peers. While 
their forecast accuracy improves as they gain more experience, they continue to hold onto 
their pessimism. On the contrary, while boom analysts are more optimistic, they are not 
necessarily more accurate. Moreover, their optimism is shown to be short-lived. 
Collectively, the above evidence suggests that the development of firm-specific human 
capital is endogenous to time-varying macroeconomic conditions. The asymmetric 
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performance of boom and recession analysts indicates that there are unobserved 




CHAPTER 2:  A CURIOUS CASE OF MENTOR INFLUENCE, 
ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE, AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Do sell-side analysts carry their early mentorship experience into their future 
careers? This chapter motivates this research question by looking into the reaction of 
various analysts to the recent BP deepwater oil spill. This chapter then provides anecdotal 
evidence on analyst mentorship on Wall Street, followed by a literature review. 
 
2.1 A Curious Case of Mentor Influence 
On April 20, 2010, BP’s deepwater oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico exploded, 
killing or injuring 28 workers. The tragic explosion was followed by a deepwater oil spill. 
As the leak was at a depth of more than 5,000 feet on the seabed, BP failed to contain the 
leak. During the following three months up to July 15, 2010, more than 53,000 barrels of 
crude oil leaked from the damaged gusher into the wide open sea. That spill is the worst 
in the U.S. history.1 In view of numerous litigations following the accident, BP in 2010 
set up a $20 billion compensation fund and estimated the total cost of cleaning, criminal 
or civil fines, and liability compensation at $41 billion.2 
The catastrophic impact of the oil spill was immediately reflected in BP’s stock 
price. Figure 2.1 shows the movements of BP’s stock price from January to December 
2010, a period surrounding the deepwater oil spill accident. After news of the oil platform 
explosion was aired in the evening of April 20, BP’s stock price responded by slipping 
0.64% to $60.09 on the next trading day. When more details of the spill surfaced on April 
                                                 
1 For instance, ABC News (May 27, 2010), “BP oil spill called worst in U.S. history, as MMS official steps 
down”, The Telegraph (May 29, 2010), “BP disaster: worst oil spill in US history turns seas into a dead 
zone”, and USA Today (July 1, 2010), “BP oil spill hits record as Gulf's worst”. 
2 Reuters (June 30, 2010), “Gulf oil spill claims should work faster”. 
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26-27, the market finally realized the massive scale of the damage and the economic 
implications of the catastrophe. In the next two trading days, the share price further 
plunged by about 5%. While there were some subsequent rebounds in the following 
months, BP’s share price continued to tank, reaching its lowest of $27.02 on June 25. 
That drop represents a 55% loss of share price after the accident in which more than half 
of BP’s market capitalization vaporized in two short months. 
While investors panicked and continued to vote with their feet with fire sales, 
Wall Street analysts were calm and puzzlingly optimistic. As of May 2010, none of 34 
analysts who follow BP had issued a single “Sell” or “Underperform” rating in view of 
the accident. In fact, one of the analyst reports did not even mention the accident.3 As of 
May 20, one month after the explosion, the mean recommendation across Wall Street 
analysts covering BP was 2.36,4 a recommendation level equivalent to a “Buy”, and an 
increase from a consensus of 2.27 a month before on April 15 before the deepwater oil 
spill.5 Perhaps more surprising is a string of upgrade announcements by various analysts, 
either to “Strong Buy” or “Buy”, shortly after the accident.6 An often-cited argument 
supporting the upgrade decision is that the market over-reacted and that the plunge is not 
warranted with respect to the temporary shock. Such optimistic biases are perhaps not 
surprising in view of decades of financial economics research on analyst incentives and 
career concerns. 
Now turn to a seemingly unrelated question: could analysts’ early career 
experience explain their different reactions in this oil spill accident? For Wall Street 
                                                 
3 Reuters (June 18, 2010), “Special report: Amid the Gulf Crisis, Wall St touted BP stock”. 
4 1 is “Strong Buy”, whereas 5 is a “Strong Sell”. 
5 The consensus recommendation data were obtained from IBES in WRDS in July 2011. 
6 The Wall Street Journal (May 28, 2010), “Large stock focus: Intel, Microsoft, BP and AmEx all jump”; 
The Washington Post (June 6, 2010), “BP investors struggle to factor in the unfathomable”; The Wall 
Street Journal (July 7, 2010), “Shares get boost from below”. 
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analysts, the first and foremost memorable experience is their mentorship experience 
when they first started their jobs as junior analysts. As protégés in an apprenticeship 
system, analysts learn their craftsmanship from writing research reports to building 
earnings models by interacting with experienced seniors. These mentors are veteran 
analysts with years of professional experience, covering the same industry, and 
presumably serving as role models for career advancements. If analysts worked with a 
group of optimistic mentors early in their careers, they could carry their experience over 
in their future professional lives. 
Figure 2.2 suggests this possibility. Going back to the BP example, I sort all 
analysts covering BP at the time of the accident into two groups: a “Strong Buy” group 
who upgraded, reiterated, or initiated a “Strong buy” recommendation after the deepwater 
oil spill; and a “Non Strong Buy” group who did otherwise. I track their mentors and 
compute their historical optimism in recommendations and earnings forecasts during the 
analysts’ early careers, where early career is defined as either an analyst’s first job or the 
first three years of analyst’s first job, whichever is shorter. I then rescale all optimism 
measures from 1 (least optimistic) to 10 (most optimistic) for comparison. Figure 2.2 
shows that the mentors of “Strong Buy” analysts were both more optimistic than “Non-
Strong Buy” mentors when analysts first started their professions. “Strong Buy” mentors 
were 50% more optimistic in earnings forecasts than, and twice as optimistic as, “Non-
Strong Buy” mentors. This suggests the possibility that analyst optimism can be 
influenced by mentor optimism in their early careers. While this example is based on a 
subset of analysts and on a single catastrophic accident, it illustrates the simple idea 




2.2 Anecdotal Evidence: Analyst Mentorship on Wall Street  
Often after attending weeks of intensive orientation and training programs, a 
newly-hired junior analyst would be assigned to one or more mentors, who are 
experienced analysts with years of industry experience and assume the main role of 
providing on-the-job training: 
The conventional mechanism for orientation and training of beginning analysts 
was the position of junior analyst. Most research departments offered very little 
further organized training or mentoring, relying nearly exclusively on junior-
senior interaction to teach the basic intellectual and marketing skills. (Groysberg, 
2010, p.203) 
 
Some of the largest wall-street brokerage houses take mentorship experience 
seriously. For instance, Bernstein requires their veteran analysts to devote fully 20% of 
their time to mentoring, hiring and other institution-building activities (Groysberg, 2010 
p.218). Other investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley also offer 
multiple structured or informal “mentor-and-buddy” programs to help junior analysts to 
develop their skills and networks through social interaction with experienced analysts. It 
is also not uncommon that experienced analysts work hand-in-hand with junior analysts 
on various projects, opening the on-the-job doors to juniors so that they learn how to 
write their research reports, run earnings model to forecast firms’ future growth, or pitch 
their ideas to sales force or institutional investors. For instance, 
In early June, I asked Megan Kulick and Mark Kastan, who had been hired to 
replace… to run a complex series of financial models assuming the Baby Bells 
started to offer long distance services… We worked on the models for six solid 
weeks (Reingold and Reingold, 2007 p.85) 
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While junior analysts usually start with number crunching, they tend to accept 
more responsibilities such as dealing with clients or sales force, attending clients’ 
meetings or writing research reports along their career path. Apart from providing 
pedagogical guidance, mentors also serve as role models for junior analysts in the 
apprentice system: 
I didn’t see anyone daring put the squeeze on Ed, my mentor. He managed to 
have strong opinions – positive and negative – without being pressured by 
anyone, not bankers, not management. As his protégés, I felt insulated and 
protected (Reingold and Reingold, 2007 p.37)  
 
or networking instrument for exposure and visibility: 
In addition to the summer associates, these nights out generally included as many 
fulltime associates as our mentors were able to round up and… (Rolfe and Troob, 
2001, p.54) 
 
The above anecdotal evidence suggests that mentorship programs are uncommon 
among sell-side equity analysts since the heavy reliance on mentor-apprentice model is a 
unique feature of equity analyst industry.7 
2.3 Literature Review 
This dissertation is motivated by the literature on analyst optimism, social 
interaction, and the emerging literature on the impact of personal past experience on 
future behavior. I provide a brief summary of these strands of literature in the following 
sections and summarize the main testable hypotheses. 
 
                                                 
7 While the above provides anecdotal evidence on various mentorship programs on the Wall Street, the 
mentors in this dissertation do not require neither a formal mentorship in any brokerage house nor a formal 
one-to-one reporting relationship between mentor and mentees. 
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2.3.1 Analyst Optimism and Career Concerns 
The first strand of research that motivates this dissertation is the analyst literature 
on forecast optimism. A common finding in analyst literature is that analysts tend to issue 
optimistic forecasts that are biased upward than actual earnings (Brown, Foster and 
Noreen 1985, Stickel 1990, Abarbanell 1991, Butler and Lang 1991, Dreman and Berry 
1995, Chorpa 1998).  
Previous literature has documented a number of external or strategic factors 
explaining this optimism bias. For instance, analysts are more optimistic for stocks that 
have equity/bond underwriting relation (Francis and Philbrick 1993, Dugar and Nathan 
1995, Lin and McNichols 1998, Michaely and Womack 1999, Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 
2000, etc.) or that have greater ownership by affiliated mutual fund families (Mola and 
Guidolin 2009), that are managed by affiliated dealers (Chung and Cho 2005)., that they 
hold favorable information (McNichols and O’Brien 1997, Hayes 1998, Das, Guo, and 
Zhang 2006). 
Analysts also exhibit optimism to generate commission for employing brokerages, 
to promote specific stocks (Hayes 1998, Irvine 2000, Irvine 2004, Jackson 2005, Johnson 
and Schwartz 2005, Cowen, Groysberg and Healy 2006), to curry favor to firm 
management in exchange for better information access (Francis and Philbrick 1993, Das, 
Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan 1998, Irvine 2004, Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 2004, 
Chen and Matsumoto 2006, Ke and Yu 2006, Ertimur, Zhang, and Muslu 2010). Analysts 
are also shown to be less optimistic when the level of institutional ownership is high for 
their covered stocks, suggesting institutional ownership to serve as a watchdog 
(Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Hong 2007). 
Studies suggest that analysts are more optimistic because of career concerns. For 
instance, Hong and Kubik (2003) show that, controlling for accuracy, analysts who are 
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more optimistic relative to their peers are more likely to be promoted to prestigious 
brokerage houses. Ke and Yu (2006) find that analysts who are initially optimistic and 
subsequent pessimistic during firm’s fiscal-year are less likely to get fired.  
 
2.3.2 Social Interaction 
The literature on economics has extensively documented the influence of social 
interaction and social ties in the context of various social issues.8 In a related vein, an 
emerging strand of finance papers analyzing social connectedness suggests that personal 
social ties have a strong influence in professional domains.9 Hong, Kubik, and Stein 
(2005) document a word-of-mouth effect in which mutual fund managers herd into 
buying or selling the same stocks held by other mutual fund managers in the same city. 
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010b) find that analysts who have educational ties with 
senior firm officers generate more accurate earnings forecasts and their recommendations 
significantly outperform, thereby providing further support that the “old boy” network 
commands a positive premium. Using firm directors’ death and retirement as an 
identification instrument, Fracassi and Tate (2011) show that the external network ties 
between CEOs and board directors weaken board monitoring. The basic findings of all 
these studies suggest that social interaction and social ties have a strong and 
economically vital influence on personal or professional decision-making. 
                                                 
8 For example, education: Aaronson (1998), Foster (2006); Carrell, Fullerton, and West (2009); crime: 
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996); cigarette smoking: Powell, Tauras, and Ross (2005); ethnicity 
and neighborhoods: Borjas (1995); teenage pregnancy and high school dropout: Evans, Oates, and Schwab 
(1992), Gaviria and Raphael (2001), etc. 
9 For instance, Duflo and Saez (2002), Hong and Kubik (2004), Massa and Simonov (2005), Hong, Kubik, 
and Stein (2005), Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), Horton and Serafeim (2009), Cohen, Frazzini, and 
Malloy (2010a), Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010b), Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2010), Fracassi and 
Tate (2010), Gray and Kern (2011), Hwang and Kim (2011), Cohen and Malloy (2011), Lerner and 
Malmendier (2011), etc. 
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2.3.3 Impact of Past Experience 
A slowing growing strand of literature also shows that individuals’ past 
experience has a long-lasting impact on their future economic behavior. Malmendier and 
Nagel (2011) show that individuals who experienced the Great Depression are less 
willing to take financial risk. Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008) find that the past IPO 
experience of investors affects their future subscription decisions. Malmendier, Tate, and 
Yan (2011) also show that CEOs with a military background pursue more aggressive 
corporate leverage strategies. Other recent finance studies also show that past experience 
affects corporate financial policies (Graham and Narasimhan, 2004; Schoar, 2007), 
subscriptions to initial public offerings (Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman, 2011), 
and the investment strategies of mutual fund managers (Greenwood and Nagel, 2009). 
Prior management literature also shows that mentorship has a significant impact on 
protégés’ turnover decisions. Whitely and Coetsier (1993) and Whitely, Dougherty, and 
Dreher (1991) both find that managers who participate in mentoring programs during 
their early careers have better promotion rates. Payne and Huffman (2005) show that 
mentoring programs reduce the turnover rate of U.S. Army officers. The common finding 
of these studies is that an individual’s past experience has a strong and long-lasting 
impact on the individual’s future economic behavior. 
No study so far has investigated whether the past experience of sell-side financial 
analysts affects their professional activities. Prior studies document that analysts are more 
accurate if their firm-specific coverage experience increases.10 Clement, Koonce, and 
Lopez (2007) find that veteran analysts who have rich task-specific experience make 
                                                 
10 For example, Clement (1997), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997), McNichols and O’Brien (1997), and 
Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999). 
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more accurate earnings forecasts, providing evidence that analysts learn from their past 
experience. The closest study to this chapter is the study by Antoniou (2010), who shows 
that analysts are affected by colleagues of current employing brokerage houses. The 
primary difference between our studies is that Antoniou (2010) asks the question to what 
extent an analyst’s optimism is affected by his or her colleagues whom the analysts 
interact with in a contemporaneous manner, whereas this study investigates the influence 
of his or her mentors, defined as senior experienced colleagues during early careers, with 
whom the analysts worked with in a historical context. More specifically, my study 
exploits a unique feature of the analyst apprenticeship system and asks a broader 




CHAPTER 3:  EARLY CAREER EXPERIENCE AND OPTIMISM 
SPILLOVER 
3.1 Introduction 
While there is a widespread agreement that sell-side equity analysts are optimistic 
for various strategic reasons,11 little is known about how their early mentorship 
experience influences their professional optimism. A small yet growing collection of 
studies shows that past personal experience affects future economic behaviors: for 
instance, the Great Depression babies are less willing to take financial risks (Malmendier 
and Nagel (2011a)); investors’ experience of personal gains increases the likelihood of 
future IPO subscription (Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008)); and CEOs with military 
backgrounds pursue more aggressive corporate leverage strategies (Malmendier, Tate, 
and Yan (2011)). The idea that economic agents assign a non-zero weight on past 
personal experience when updating their beliefs is consistent with social learning in 
economics literature (Banerjee (1992), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), Bala and 
Goyal (1998)); however, no study has examined the influence of analysts’ past 
experience on their professional careers. Even though we have the largest number of 
equity analysts in the world, we still do not fully understand how analysts’ optimism is 
                                                 
11 A common finding in the analyst literature is that analysts tend to issue optimistic forecasts that are 
biased upward compared to actual earnings (Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1985), Stickel (1990), Abarbanell 
(1991), Butler and Lang (1991), Francis and Philbrick (1993), Dreman and Berry (1995), Hunton and 
McEwen (1997), Chorpa (1998)). Specifically, analysts tend to walk down their forecasts during firms’ 
fiscal years (Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004). There are several strategic reasons to explain analyst 
optimism: client affiliation or trading commission incentives (Francis and Philbrick (1993), Dugar and 
Nathan (1995), Hayes (1998), Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), Dechow, Hutton, 
and Sloan (2000), Irvine (2000, 2004), Chung and Cho (2005), Jackson (2005), Johnson and Schwartz 
(2005), O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin (2005), Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006), Mola and Guidolin 
(2009)), career concerns (Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), Hong and Kubik (2003)), or better 
information access (Francis and Philbrick (1993), Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998), Lim (2001), 
Irvine (2004), Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004), Chen and Matsumoto (2006), Ke and Yu (2006), 
Ertimur, Muslu, and Zhang (2011)). In contrast, institutional investors serve as a watchdog, dampening the 
excessive optimism (Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Hong (2007)).  
 14
influenced by their on-the-job learning experience. As analysts are often blamed for their 
optimistic view,12 understanding a source of analyst optimism is the key to improving our 
knowledge about how equity analysts process and disseminate information. 
In this chapter, I examine whether analysts’ early career experience influences 
their future professional styles. Specifically, this study asks whether sell-side analysts 
differ in their professional optimism depending on the styles of the mentors with whom 
they work in their first jobs as junior analysts. The key conjecture of this mentorship 
experience hypothesis is that analyst optimism should exhibit a systematic relationship to 
the optimism of the mentors with whom a protégé works in his or her early career, which 
is defined as the analyst’s first analyst job or the first three years of the analyst’s first job, 
whichever is shorter. Analysts are expected to exhibit more optimistic in their later 
careers if they work with optimistic mentors in their early careers. If mentors in analysts’ 
early careers have no influence on their protégés’ professional styles, we should not 
observe any systematic relationship between analyst and mentor optimism. 
A few simple bar charts in Figure 3.1 suggest this systematic pattern in the raw 
data. Using a host of optimism metrics that comprehensively describe analysts’ 
professional styles: (i) portfolio weight of strong buy recommendations (Strong Buys), 
(ii) frequency of upgrade jumps (Upgrade Jumps), (iii) optimism in earnings forecasts 
(Earnings Forecast Optimism), and (iv) optimism in price targets (Price Growth 
Optimism), the patterns in the figure consistently suggest that analysts pick up the styles 
of their mentors with whom they work in their first jobs as junior analysts. In other 
                                                 
12 An often-cited incidence is analysts’ role in the most recent dot-com bubble in the late 1990s. During the 
Internet bubble, analysts were under constant pressure to issue favorable stock recommendations for 
affiliated stocks. After the SEC’s prolonged investigation, a Global Research Agreement was finally 
reached in 2003 between the SEC and ten of the largest investment firms in which the latter paid civil and 
other penalties of $1.4 billion for their misconduct during the technology-bubble era 
(http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalsettlement.htm). 
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words, analysts are more optimistic in their future professional careers if they work with 
optimistic mentors in their early careers. While these rudimentary snapshots support the 
mentorship experience hypothesis, I further examine in this chapter whether this 
systematic relationship persists after controlling for optimistic analysts self-selecting into 
optimistic brokerage houses in their first jobs. More importantly, I conduct a series of 
exercises to ensure that these results are not a rediscovery nor a manifestation of those 
analyst characteristics or differences in information environments shown in prior studies 
that should explain analyst optimism. 
While this chapter relates to a growing body of finance and economics studies 
that show how past experience influences future decisions,13 the findings in this chapter 
also relate to recent social network studies showing that social connection has a strong 
influence in professional domains. For instance, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) 
document a word-of-mouth effect in which mutual fund managers flock to buy or sell the 
same stocks held by other mutual fund managers in their cities. Cohen, Frazzini, and 
Malloy (2010b) find that the recommendations made by analysts who have educational 
ties with senior firm officers tend to significantly outperform stocks without school ties, 
providing support for the belief that the “old boy” network commands a positive 
premium.14 As the apprenticeship system in the analyst industry also relies on a 
                                                 
13 This research addresses a wide range of decision making, including: corporate financial policies 
(Graham and Narasimhan (2004), Schoar (2008), Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2010)), 401(k) savings (Choi, 
Laibson, Madrian, Metrick (2009)), inflation expectation (Malmendier and Nagel (2011b)), stock market or 
IPO entry decisions (Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman (2011), Kaustia and Knüpfer (2011)), 
investment and savings decisions (Puri and Robinson (2007), Osili and Paulson (2008)), aggregate 
consumption (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007)), trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008)), and the 
investment strategies of mutual fund managers (Greenwood and Nagel (2009)). 
14 Other related papers showing that social ties have an influence on individuals’ decision making are as 
follows: Duflo and Saez (2002), Feng and Seasholes (2004), Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004), Massa and 
Simonov (2005), Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), Ivoković and 
Weisbenner (2007), Brown, Ivoković, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008), Horton and Serafeim (2009), Hwang 
and Kim (2009), Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010a), Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010b), Engelberg, 
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connected neighbor structure (between mentors and protégés) for information sharing and 
dissemination, it is an ideal testground to examine the influence of past experience in this 
specific nature of social connection.15 
In fact, establishing the analysts’ social networks is critical to answering the 
research question. The key empirical innovation of this chapter is as follows. Rather than 
using a social network database, I exploit a unique feature of the widely available IBES 
(International Brokers Estimate System) dataset: each earnings forecast or 
recommendation issued by analysts is accompanied by a unique brokerage identifier. 
Using this brokerage identifying information, I reconstruct the employment timeline of 
all sell-side analysts in the raw IBES data and trace when and where analysts previously 
worked. This micro-level panel permits me to address the question of whether analysts 
are influenced by their mentors. I define Mentors as those colleagues who work in the 
same brokerage house (i.e., same house), cover the same sector (i.e., same team), and 
have more years of professional experience (i.e., veteran) during analysts’ early careers 
as junior analysts.16 
The major findings are summarized as follows. First, analysts are more optimistic 
in their future professional careers if they work with optimistic mentors in their early 
careers: analysts issue more strong buy recommendations and upgrade jumps, and are 
more optimistic in earnings forecasts and price targets. Depending on optimism metrics 
and regression specifications, a one standard deviation increase in standardized mentor 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gao, and Parsons (2010), Fracassi and Tate (2010), Shive (2010), Gray and Kern (2011), Cohen and 
Malloy (2011), Kaustia and Knüpfer (2011), Lerner and Malmendier (2011), etc. 
15 This study also relates to Antoniou (2010). However, we address completely different research questions 
with different identification strategies. 
16 This definition is also supported in anecdotal evidence. For instance, “[a]ccess to a capable colleague 
who covers a closely related sector matters most. When Lehman Brothers was rated the best research 
department on Wall Street in the 1990s, its analysts benefited from team-based research processes that 
heightened their awareness of developments in related sectors and their ability to evaluate such 
developments knowledgeably.” (Groysberg (2010, p.57)). 
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optimism leads to an increase in standardized analyst optimism by the following 
magnitudes: 4.341% in Strong Buys, 5.935% in Upgrade Jumps, 3.955% in Earnings 
Forecast Optimism, and 7.982% in Price Growth Optimism. In economic terms, they 
respectively represent increases in corresponding metrics by 4.70%, 10.04%, 2.17%, and 
4.342%, which are economically meaningful and non-trivial. 
Specifically, having optimistic mentors in an analyst’s early career increases his 
or her probability of becoming optimistic by 4.303%-8.097%, depending on the 
regression specifications. In contrast, pessimistic mentors are more likely to influence 
their protégés to be pessimistic by 1.747% to 5.130%. Optimistic mentors also have an 
asymmetrically stronger impact than pessimistic mentors. An interesting explanation for 
these asymmetric impacts would be as follows: if junior analysts who self-select 
themselves into the equity analyst profession are inherently more optimistic (than the 
average person) in general, they could be more likely to be influenced by optimistic 
(versus pessimistic) colleagues in their early careers. 
While there is a spillover in optimism, there is no spillover in accuracy. In other 
words, while it is easy for analysts to pick up their mentors’ styles, it is apparently harder 
for them to pick up their mentors’ skills. Only talented superstar mentors (i.e., all-star 
analysts) can break this pattern, spilling their forecasting skills to their protégés. What is 
more intriguing is that, controlling for accuracy, optimism, brokerage size, analyst 
characteristics (i.e., general experience, firm-specific experience), or portfolio complexity 
(i.e., number of companies, number of industries), analysts with all star mentors in their 
early careers are almost 6% more likely to be elected as all-star analysts than analysts 
with no star mentors. This finding suggests that having superstar mentors in analysts’ 
early careers makes a substantial economic difference. 
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The interesting contrast between style and skills spillover also leads to a more 
fundamental question about the mentorship system as a whole: are talented analysts born 
or made? On the one hand, optimism and accuracy spillover evidence suggests analysts 
only pick up the styles but not the skills of their mentors, whereas only a subset of 
talented mentors are able to unwind this pattern. On the other hand, the evidence on 
reputation spillover is intriguing given that analysts’ accuracy and other analyst-specific 
characteristics have been controlled for. A possible explanation to reconcile these 
findings is that talented mentors transfer more than forecasting skills to their protégés, in 
whom these skills are demanded by sophisticated institutional investors. The results also 
consistent with general human capital theories that knowledge and skills are acquired 
through education and on-the-job learning experience (Rees (1979), Rosen (1981)). The 
evidence suggests that it simply takes more time than the span of a first job for junior 
analysts to learn skills from their mentors.17 
The results above have important implications for regulators (by identifying a 
new source of optimism), for the analyst profession (by addressing talent management 
and portability), and for investor (by identifying a simple way to debias analyst 
optimism); however, it remains unclear as to whether or not investors would care about 
the visible influence of mentors on their protégés. More specifically, it is interesting to 
further understand how rational market participants would react to the recommendations 
made by this group of biased agents, as there is a lack of empirical evidence explicitly 
examining their interaction in a market setting. I show that the market is smart in 
identifying the protégés of optimistic mentors, given that the short-run market reaction to 
their forecast revisions is generally weaker by 15-23 basis points within 10-day window. 
                                                 
17 The common examples include how to approach firm CEOs, CFOs, competitors or suppliers for better 
information access, how to extract information from firms’ earnings conference calls, or how to analyze 
firm fundamentals for better forecasts, etc. 
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Motivated by recent studies that show how sophisticated institutional investors take 
analyst characteristics into account when digesting the information in their revisions18, I 
examine which group of investors is the main driver for the discounting. The results 
suggest that these weaker reactions primarily concentrate on stocks that are highly held 
by institutional investors, who discount the revisions made by the protégés of optimistic 
mentors by 33-38 basis points within 10-day window. This suggests that institutional 
investors are sophisticated about identifying the apprentices of optimistic mentors and 
correspondingly discount their revisions; they also take into account analyst 
characteristics when incorporating the information in their revisions. 
To further disentangle treatment effect and selection effect,19 this chapter adopts a 
set of falsification tests and econometric exercises. First, to control for analysts’ potential 
selection into brokerage houses due to unobserved brokerage firm culture or incentives, 
all regressions control for brokerage house fixed effects (Wooldridge (2001, Chapter 
10)).20 All results are robust to different types of brokerage house fixed effects. Second, 
additional test examining the span of analysts’ first jobs also shows that the spillover is 
stronger among those analysts who spend a longer time with their mentors in their first 
jobs, thereby supporting the conclusion that analysts are influenced by their mentors via 
social learning. Third, I further exploit the size of brokerage houses where analysts first 
                                                 
18 For instance, Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), Hugon and Muslu (2010), and Jiang, Kumar, and 
Law (2011). 
19 A classic example that differentiates treatment and selection effect is made by a journalist, Malcolm 
Gladwell (“Getting In” in The New Yorker, October 10, 2005): “Social scientists distinguish between what 
are known as treatment effects and selection effects. The Marine Corps, for instance, is largely a treatment-
effect institution. It doesn’t have an enormous admissions office grading applicants along four separate 
dimensions of toughness and intelligence. It’s confident that the experience of undergoing Marine Corps 
basic training will turn you into a formidable soldier. A modeling agency, by contrast, is a selection-effect 
institution. You don't become beautiful by signing up with an agency. You get signed up by an agency 
because you’re beautiful.” 
20 The use of fixed effects coupled with a lagged explanatory variable (i.e., mentor optimism in the current 
context) is also identical to the approach used in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2011a, 2011b) and Kaustia 
and Knüpfer (2011) to mitigate the endogeneity concern. 
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start their jobs. The idea is that, if self-selection is true, analysts who start their jobs in 
large brokerage houses simply have more potential mentors to pick and choose from to 
begin with. If this is the case, the estimated coefficients on Mentor Optimism should be 
stronger for larger than smaller brokerage houses. The results suggest that estimates are 
not necessarily stronger for larger than smaller brokerage houses. Furthermore, the above 
systematic pattern remains robust even controlling for a wide selection of mentors’ 
performance- or demographic-related characteristics, and between specialized and 
diversified analysts. 
To further establish causation rather than correlation, I also exploit the fact that 
each analyst holds a dual role—while analysts are protégés to their seniors, they are also 
mentors to those rookies who later join the same house. As such, I examine an opposite 
hypothesis that analysts are influenced by their junior colleagues. Specifically, I estimate 
the optimism of Juniors, who are defined as those house colleagues who cover the same 
sector but have fewer years of experience during analysts’ early careers. I then augment 
this Junior Optimism in the baseline regressions. If juniors spill over their optimism 
upward (i.e., reverse causality), the estimated coefficient on Junior Optimism is expected 
to be significantly positive. Alternatively, if the systematic pattern between Analyst 
Optimism and Mentor Optimism is driven by self-selection (i.e., selection effect), we 
should also observe a strong and positive coefficient on Junior Optimism, as optimistic 
rookie analysts self-select themselves into optimistic houses. However, the results show 
no evidence of reverse spillover of optimism from protégés to their mentors. The absence 
of reverse spillover in optimism further suggests the following conclusions: first, there is 
a clear causality channel by which analysts learn their mentors’ styles during their early 
careers, but not vice versa. Second, the systematic pattern in optimism spillover cannot be 
explained by analysts’ self-selection in their early careers, as indicated by the lack of 
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spillover in Junior Optimism. Collectively, the results suggest that the above systematic 
spillover cannot be wholly attributed to self-selection. 
The results in this chapter are not a rediscovery of those factors shown in prior 
studies that should explain analyst optimism: all panel regressions control for year 
effects, industry effects, analyst characteristics and differences in information 
environment.21 The inclusion of time fixed effects absorbs any time-series variation in 
analyst optimism due to labor market conditions, time-varying aggregate risk aversion or 
market sentiment. Controlling for industry ensures that results are driven by industry-
specific variation in analyst optimism. Including analyst characteristics in all estimations 
ensures that the results are not manifestations of those analyst characteristics that have 
previously been shown to influence analyst optimism. Leveling the information 
environment through controlling for information variables also guards against picking up 
results driven by differences in information environment. 
The results survive an extensive list of robustness checks. The results are similar 
if analysts with thin portfolio coverage are excluded. Excluding IBES data prior to 1993 
does not explain away the results.22 Using current brokerage house fixed effects (instead 
of first brokerage house) makes the results stronger. The enactment of Regulation FD 
does not drive away the optimism spillover. Results remain strong and robust even 
controlling for analysts’ year of entry, which could correlate with initial labor market 
condition or macroeconomic environment, or for year-sector fixed effects, which could 
correlate with industry-specific sentiment (e.g., the technology industry in late 1990s). 
                                                 
21 A firm’s information environment includes all publicly available information for the firm. An 
information environment is competitive when there are many information intermediaries who actively 
collect and disseminate firm information. 
22 Pre-1993 IBES data could be subject to a general delay as the data may not become publicly available on 
a real-time basis (O’Brien (1988), Zitzewitz (2001), Bernhardt, Campbello, and Kutsoati (2004)). 
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An alternative estimation methodology based on Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions also 
yields similar results. 
Results are not driven by research design. First, there is no survivorship bias in 
the sample: as mentor optimism is historically measured and carried as a static variable in 
regressions, analyst observations will remain in the sample even when their mentors 
leave the sample for different reasons. Second, as mentors are defined as analysts who 
cover the same sector under the current definition, it may be harder for analysts who 
begin their careers in small brokerage houses to locate mentors as small brokerage 
houses, unlike large counterparts, have comparatively limited resources and therefore are 
less likely to engage in clear sector specialization. Using a “hybrid” mentor panel 
allowing small brokerage analysts to have mentors regardless of whether their mentors 
cover the same sector, I show that the results are robust to this research design change. 
Moreover, to ensure that the results do not reflect any mechanical relationships23 between 
analyst optimism and past mentor optimism, I conduct a counterfactual simulation. More 
specifically, analysts are paired up with random mentors. Using this panel of Pseudo-
Mentors, I show that there is no optimism spillover once the unique mentor-protégé 
relationship is broken and analysts are teamed up with pseudo-mentors. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the 
sample data, methodology, and main testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 discusses the main 
results. Robustness tests are summarized in Section 3.4. Conclusion is in Section 3.5. 
 
                                                 
23 From econometrics standpoint, a relationship is mechanical when a common component is present on 
both sides of a regression (i.e., the dependent and independent variables). A simple analogy would be 
regressing IBM’s stock return on day t on its stock return on day t. A mechanical relationship could induce 
biased estimates and give rise to spurious conclusion. In the current context, this test is primarily motivated 
as there is a shared tag of “optimism” in Analyst Optimism and Mentor Optimism, despite the fact that they 
have completely different constructs.  
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3.2 Sample, Methodology, and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Reconstructing a Panel on Employment History 
The reconstruction procedures are outlined below, whereas additional details are 
provided in Appendix 1. The source of the sample of earnings forecasts (1983-2010), 
price targets (1999-2010), and stock recommendations (1993-2010) is the Thomson 
Reuters’ IBES dataset. Each earnings forecast, price target or stock recommendation is 
tagged with the date and unique identifiers identifying the issuing analyst and the 
brokerage house. Using this unique identifying information, I reconstruct the employment 
histories of sell-side analysts from 1983 to 2010. An analyst is employed in a brokerage 
house in month t if the analyst issues an earnings forecast under the brokerage house 
identifier.24 
Using this panel, I track all other analysts who work in the same brokerage house 
during an analyst’s early career. Recall that Mentors are defined as those colleagues who 
work in the same brokerage house (i.e., same house), cover the same sector (i.e., same 
team), and have more years of professional experience (i.e., veteran) during an analyst’s 
early career. To mirror the high job mobility of Wall Street analysts in real life, these 
identified mentors are not required to stay at a given firm throughout the analyst’s early 
career. In other words, these identified colleagues can either enter earlier or leave later 
than the analyst does. As it is impossible to have complete access to analysts’ itineraries 
on which colleagues they have met, these criteria are designed to maximize the 
possibilities that analysts do actually interact socially with their mentors during their 
                                                 
24 A prior study by Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) documents that historical IBES stock 
recommendations were altered in the IBES vintages from 2000 to 2007. Thomson Reuters is aware of this 
problem and, according to the FAQs in WRDS (Wharton Research Data Services), has made corrections 
for the current recommendation dataset in WRDS. As the stock recommendations used in this study are 
obtained from the 2011 vintage, the data should be free from this problem. In contrast, according to WRDS, 
there is no known issue for earnings forecast or price target datasets in prior vintages. 
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early careers. As previously mentioned, Early Career is defined as the analyst’s first job 
or the first three years of the analyst’s first job as junior analyst, whichever is shorter, 
provided that the analyst remains at the brokerage house for at least six months.25 The 
choice of a three-year window is arbitrary but identical to that in Hong and Kubik (2003), 
and it is motivated by the high job-turnover rate observed in the first three years of an 
analyst’s career. Moreover, following Hong and Kubik (2003), an analyst must have at 
least three years of experience prior to being included in the sample.26 Analysts are also 
required to cover at least three firms in any given year.27 These requirements are imposed 
to ensure that the results are not driven by extreme values in analyst optimism metrics, as 
is commonly observed across young analysts who have thin portfolio coverage.28 
 
3.2.2 Measuring Optimism 
Instead of relying on a single optimism metric, I structure my analyses around 
four distinct metrics designed to capture different styles of analyst optimism. Using four 
metrics helps crudely examine if results are sensitive to the particular metric chosen. All 
four optimism metrics are designed to capture the optimism of an analyst relative to his 
or her peers. 
                                                 
25 The results are not sensitive to these requirements. Results without the six-month minimum requirement 
are similar. Results without the three-year requirement are slightly weaker. This is expected as the number 
of panel observation is in negative relationship with this upper threshold (i.e., higher upper threshold and 
fewer observations lead to lower power). 
26 Anecdotal Wall Street evidence also suggests that junior analysts on average spend three years to get 
promoted to senior analysts. For instance, Rolfe and Troob (2001, p.9) describe the three-year benchmark: 
“Following their two- to three-year stint, the vast majority of the analysts will either strike out for any of a 
handful of graduate business schools, depart the firm for other opportunities within Wall Street’s financial 
community, or regain their sanity and elect to pursue other interests entirely.” 
27 As (1) analyst must have at least three years of experience and (2) Mentors must have more years of 
experience than their protégés do, these two requirements collectively make Mentors to have at least four 
years of experience prior to being included in the final sample. 
28 Removing the restriction on analysts to have at least three firms in their portfolios in a given year will 
make the baseline results stronger. 
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The first optimism metric is Strong Buys, which is computed as the number of 
strong buy recommendations initiated, upgraded, or reinitiated divided by the total 
number of outstanding recommendations made by an analyst in a given year. The weight 
ranges from 0.0 (i.e., no strong buy recommendations) to 1.0 (i.e., only strong buy 
recommendations). Optimistic analysts are expected to issue more strong buy 
recommendations, controlling for other known analyst characteristics or variables on 
information environments. 
The second metric is Upgrade Jumps, which is computed based on the number of 
upgrade jumps to the total number of recommendation revisions made by an analyst in a 
given year. A revision is regarded as a jump if the revision in recommendation rating for 
a given firm is not to its immediately adjacent rating category. For instance, an upgrade is 
a jump when the rating is upgraded from “Sell” to “Buy.”29 Optimistic analysts are 
expected to issue more upgrade jumps. Like Strong Buys, this metric ranges from 0.0 
(least optimistic) to 1.0 (most optimistic). As both Strong Buys and Upgrade Jumps are 
constructed based on the recommendations issued in a given year, it is effective to put in 
year fixed effects when constructing these relative measures.30 Moreover, as Upgrade 
Jumps could lead analysts to issue more strong buys in a given year, these two metrics 
should mildly correlate in the data. 
                                                 
29 Following IBES classification, a recommendation ranges from Strong Buy, Buy, Hold, Sell, to Strong 
Sell. 
30 While Upgrade Jumps denotes changes in analyst opinion, it does not depend on earnings 
announcements or issuances of management guidance for three main reasons. First, Upgrade Jumps 
conditional on a public signal effectively removes a substantial portion of upgrades that could contain 
private information. Second, it is not entirely clear to determine ex ante the length of the response window. 
Analysts who are slow to respond outside a prescribed event window may be misclassified. Third, the main 
objective of the optimism metrics is to comprehensively analyze analysts’ styles without depending on 
information, which could complicate the result interpretation. 
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The third optimism metric is the percentile-rank optimism, Earnings Forecast 
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Rank of forecast error is a rank variable based on the rank of an analyst’s forecast 
error depending on one-year-ahead EPS forecasts. The most (least) optimistic analyst 
covering stock j in time t would be given the first (last) rank. As this metric is conditional 
on the same firm-year, this is identical to controlling for firm-year fixed effects. 
Following Hong and Kubik (2003), this measure is calculated on a three-year rolling 
window. To reduce extreme values made by analysts who maintain thin portfolio 
coverage, I further rank this metric and assign a value between 1 (least optimistic) and 
100 (most optimistic).32 It is also important to control for forecast horizon when using 
this measure as analysts tend to walk down their earnings forecasts during the fiscal year 
for management to beat (Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004)). 
The last metric is Price Growth Optimism, which is computed based on the one-
year-ahead split-adjusted price target to the split-adjusted stock price on announcement 
date. Similar to Earnings Forecast Optimism, I rank this metric each year and assign a 
                                                 
31 This metric is commonly used in the analyst literature (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), and 
Hong and Kubik (2003)). The main advantage of using percentile-rank optimism is that the optimism of 
analysts is compared to that of their peers. This stands in contrast to Absolute Optimism, which is defined 
as the difference of earnings forecasts above actual earnings. Under Absolute Optimism, analysts covering 
stock j can all be optimistic as long as their forecasts are above actual earnings. As such, percentile-rank 
relative optimism compensates this shortcoming and analysts are ranked relative to their peers in which by 
construct a portion of analysts must be optimistic/pessimistic. Results based on absolute optimism are 
reported in Section 5.4. 
32 My results are not sensitive to this requirement as the baseline results would be similar or sometimes 
stronger without this treatment. 
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value between 1 (least optimistic) and 100 (most optimistic), thereby creating a bound for 
this metric to ensure that it is not driven by extreme values. 
 
3.2.3 Mentor Optimism 
Metrics of mentor optimism are constructed in the same manner. The only 
difference is that all mentor optimism metrics are snapshots measured during analysts’ 
first jobs. Specifically, for each analyst, his or her mentor optimism is computed using 
the average of all mentor-year optimism metrics. This resulting measure is then carried 
forward as a static explanatory variable. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates an example of the timeline on Mentor Optimism. For 
instance, if an analyst spends his or her first three years (from years t to t+2) in a 
brokerage house, Mentor Optimism is measured based on the optimism of the mentors in 
the analyst’s first brokerage house during years t to t+2. To ensure that Analyst Optimism 
and Mentor Optimism are not endogenous, Analyst Optimism is only measured the year 
after his or her first job from years t+3 and onward. Specifically, Analyst Optimism is 
only measured at least a year after his or her first job. In short, those optimism metrics are 
not measured simultaneously but sequentially, where historical Mentor Optimism is 
measured and carried forward as a fixed, static explanatory variable in all regressions. 
 
3.2.4 Main Testable Hypotheses 
Motivated by the literature summarized in the preceding sections, I conjecture that 
the past mentorship experience of Wall Street analysts has an impact on their professional 
careers and posit the following testable hypotheses: 
 28
H1:  Analyst optimism is influenced by the optimism of their mentors in their early 
careers. 
H1a: Analysts are more optimistic if they work with optimistic mentors in 
their early careers. 
H1b: Analysts are more likely to be optimistic if they work with optimistic 
mentors in their early careers.  
 
While H1a and H1b ask similar questions, there is a subtle difference between 
them: H1a uses panel regressions to examine whether there is a systematic relationship 
between past mentor optimism and future analyst optimism, whereas H1b uses logistic 
regressions to investigate whether analysts would be more optimistic if they start their 
careers with optimistic mentors. 
While the first hypothesis projects whether analysts’ professional styles are 
influenced by their mentors, the immediate question is whether investors would care 
about the visible influence of mentors on their protégés. Specifically, it is unclear 
whether the market would benefit from identifying the protégés of optimistic mentors. As 
such, I further conjecture that the market is smart in identifying optimistic analysts based 
on their past mentors: 
H2: The market is smart in identifying the protégés of optimistic mentors. 
H2a: Short-run market reactions to forecast revisions made by analysts who 
work with optimistic mentors in their early careers are weaker. 
 
3.3 Main Results 
In this section, I first provide a brief descriptive statistics summary. Next, I 
present the main results, showing that analyst optimism is influenced by their mentors in 
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their early careers. Further evidence on the influence of optimistic mentors, skills 
spillover, market reaction, and causality of optimism spillover is then summarized. 
 
3.3.1 Brief Statistics Summary 
Panel A of Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables in this 
study. In a given year, 24% of analysts’ recommendations are strong buys and 13% of 
their recommendation upgrades are upgrade jumps. Analysts also tend to have similar 
levels of optimism in earnings forecasts and price targets to those of their mentors. 
Panel B of Table 3.1 summarizes the correlations among different optimism 
metrics. Conditional on the same analysts, analysts who hold more strong buy 
recommendations tend to issue more large recommendation upgrades in a given year, as 
Strong Buys and Upgrade Jumps are both mildly correlated (correlation=0.557).33 In 
contrast, Price Growth Optimism exhibits little correlation with Earnings Forecast 
Optimism (correlation=0.014), and the correlation is not significant at the 10% level. In 
general, mentor optimism metrics generally show modest correlations with protégés’ 
optimism metrics (i.e., 0.060 of Earnings Forecast Optimism to 0.220 of Price Growth 
Optimism).34 
                                                 
33 This supports an earlier conjecture that upgrade jumps could lead analysts to issue more strong buys 
(Section 2.2) as these two optimism metrics are mildly correlated with each other. 
34 Hong and Kubik (2003) show that from 1983 to 2000 an analyst’s relative optimism and accuracy are 
negatively correlated (about -0.18), which I am able to replicate (correlation: -0.162); however, an analyst’s 
relative optimism and accuracy are not necessarily negatively correlated by design. A simple example 
would illustrate this point. Assume two analysts (A and B) make forecast errors of +0.5 and -0.5, 
respectively. While they both score 100 in percentile-rank accuracy, analyst A (B) would score 100 (0) in 
percentile-rank optimism. In other words, an analyst’s relative optimism and accuracy are not necessarily a 
hard-wired relationship. Raw data also suggest a similar conjecture, as the correlation of optimism and 
accuracy is positive (correlation: 0.0783) from 2001 to 2010.  
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Panel C of Table 3.1 summarizes the number of analysts and their mentors in the 
sample.35 Over the 26 years from 1985 to 2010, the final sample covers about 40% of 
analysts in IBES.36 For analysts who start their careers in a given year, they generally 
work with 3.73 mentors, who are veteran analysts with more years of professional 
experience and cover the same sector in the same firm. As Wall Street brokerage houses 
are sharpening their business focus by specializing in certain sectors (Clement and Tse 
(2005), Sonney (2009)), the average number of mentors (6.33) is slightly higher than the 
median (3.73). 
 
3.3.2 Baseline Specifications 
To examine whether analyst optimism is influenced by mentor optimism, I run the 
following baseline panel regression: 
 
 , 1 2 3 ,   i t i i tAnalyst Optimism Mentor Optimism X Fixed Effects e         (2) 
 
For each analyst i in year t, I regress the analyst i's optimism on Mentor 
Optimism, a k-vector a (K×1) of control variables (X), and a set of fixed effects 
controlling for differences in information environments. Mentor Optimism does not have 
a subscript of time t since it is a snapshot taken during analysts’ first jobs as junior 
analysts. The main coefficient of interest is β1 as it captures the influence of past mentor 
optimism on analyst optimism. X is a set of control variables including a host of known 
analyst characteristics or other variables that have been shown in prior literature to have 
                                                 
35 While the IBES dataset starts in 1982, the sample period starts years later in 1985, as analysts are 
required to have at least three years of experience prior to being included in the sample (Hong and Kubik 
(2003)). 
36 Unreported tests show that the raw data on the number of IBES analysts are similar to those reported in 
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010b). 
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an influence on analyst optimism.37 They include analyst forecast accuracy (Accuracy), 
number of companies, number of industries, general experience, firm-specific experience, 
all-star analyst status, the proportion of affiliated clients (Underwriting), days to year-
end,38 and firm coverage (i.e., the average analyst coverage of an analyst’s portfolio of 
firms).39 Fixed effects refer to time and industry fixed effects.40 Putting in these fixed 
effects serves to absorb any time-variation in the optimism metrics over sample years. 
This is done to ensure that the results do not capture business cycles, enactment of 
regulations (e.g., Regulation FD) or industry-specific environment (e.g., Griffin, Harris, 
Shu, and Topaloglu (2011)).41 To address the concern that optimism metrics are likely to 
be correlated within analysts, all standard errors are clustered at analyst level.42  
As Mentor Optimism is measured during analysts’ early careers, it is possible that 
optimistic analysts in their early careers self-select themselves into optimistic brokerage 
houses. If that is the case, an endogeneity issue could arise as metrics on mentor 
optimism could be endogenous (McNichols and O’Brien (1997)). To mitigate the 
                                                 
37 For instance, O’Brien (1988), Klein (1990), Clement (1999), Richardson, Hong, and Wysocki (2004), 
Clement and Tse (2005), and Clement, Koonce, and Lopez (2007). 
38 Clement (1999) shows that absolute earnings forecast error increases when day to fiscal year-end 
increases. Studies by O’Brien (1988) and Klein (1990) also show that analyst optimism declines throughout 
the firms’ fiscal year. 
39 Firm coverage assesses how crowded analyst coverage is for a stock. 
40 Specifically, industry fixed effects are constructed based on IBES sectors (13 of them). 
41 While it would be ideal to put in mentor fixed effects, it is not possible to do so for two reasons. First, 
there are multiple mentors for each analyst. As such, it is not entirely clear whether to put in one fixed 
effect for each mentor or for each group of mentors. Second, putting in high-dimensional mentor fixed 
effects would quickly run into the “curse of dimensionality” problem, as the number of mentor fixed effects 
may approach cross-sectional observations in early years, thereby quickly exhausting the degree of 
freedom. Besides, instead of controlling for first brokerage house fixed effects, the above regression could 
control for research director fixed effects as research directors may have a direct influence on analysts’ 
outputs. However, collation of such data proves to be difficult as data on research directors are not 
available for years earlier than 1996, and they require substantial manual matching.  
42 The results reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are not sensitive to the non-linearity in control variables. 
Specifically, I transform control variables including Number of companies, Number of industries, Days to 
fiscal year-end, Firm coverage, Brokerage size, Firm-specific experience into non-linear variables by 
taking a natural logarithm of one plus the variable of interest. The results based on these non-linear control 
variables are almost identical to those reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
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endogeneity concern in mentor optimism, which is a snapshot taken when they are in 
their first brokerage houses, I have included first brokerage house fixed effects in all 
panel regressions, which take a value of one for each house that analysts and mentors 
have both belonged to during their early careers (Wooldridge (2001, Chapter 10)).43 
Moreover, it is important to note that the sample begins after analysts’ first jobs to avoid 
any contemporaneous estimation. 
  
3.3.3 Main Results: Optimism Spillover 
The baseline results on optimism spillover are reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In 
Table 3.2, Strong Buys and Upgrade Jumps, two analyst optimism metrics, are regressed 
on their corresponding mentor optimism metrics. The results show that across all 
specifications, there is a strong systematic relationship between analyst and past mentor 
optimism while controlling for other factors. For Strong Buys under Columns (1)-(4), the 
coefficients are significantly positive, ranging from 4.341% to 6.276% (t-statistics from 
2.36 to 3.47). Significantly positive results are also observed for Upgrade Jumps under 
Columns (5)-(8): the estimated coefficients range from 5.935 to 6.983 (t-statistics from 
3.12 to 3.54). Since all independent and dependent variables have been standardized with 
mean zero and unit standard deviation, it is easy to translate these coefficients into 
economic magnitudes: a one standard deviation increase in Strong Buys leads to a 4.70% 
increase in Strong Buys.44 On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase in mentor 
                                                 
43 As previously mentioned, the use of fixed effects coupled with a lagged explanatory variable is identical 
to the approach used in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2011a, 2011b) and Kaustia and Knüpfer (2011) to 
mitigate the endogeneity concern. 
44 Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in Strong Buys leads to a 1.129% (=4.341%×0.26) 
increase in analyst Strong Buys. Relative to the mean of analyst Strong Buys of 0.24, that would translate to 
about a 4.70% increase in Strong Buys. 
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Upgrade Jumps leads to a 10.04% increase in Upgrade Jumps, which is economically 
significant. 
A similar systematic spillover is observed using two other metrics based on 
earnings forecasts (Columns 1-4) and price targets (Columns 5-8) in Table 3.3. All 
specifications in Table 3.3 regressing Earnings Forecast Optimism and Price Growth 
Optimism on their historical mentor counterparts produce statistically strong and positive 
coefficients. The estimated coefficients on mentor Earnings Forecast Optimism range 
from 3.955% to 4.175%. As such, a one standard deviation increase in mentor Earnings 
Forecast Optimism leads to an increase ranging from 2.17% to 2.24%. In addition, the 
estimated effects of mentor Price Growth Optimism range from 7.982% to 11.890%. The 
economic significance of those estimates ranges from 4.342% to 6.466%, which again are 
economically significant findings.  
Using standardized variables permits us to directly address the question of which 
explanatory variable has a larger explanatory power. Mentor optimism plays a non-trivial 
role in explaining future analyst optimism: the absolute magnitudes of the metrics on 
mentor optimism are ranked as the second most important determinants in Strong Buys, 
Upgrade Jumps, and Price Growth Optimism, and the fourth most important in Forecast 
Earnings Optimism. For other determinants, brokerage size unsurprisingly has a strong 
deterring effect on analyst optimism. This is because brokerage size is positively related 
to the firm’s reputation, and large brokerage houses would be expected without the need 
for their analysts to exhibit excessive optimism. This finding is consistent with the 
evidence in Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998), Lim (2001), and Cowen, 
Groysberg, and Healy (2006). On the other hand, consistent with the finding in Clement 
(1999), Days to Year-end, which describes the timeliness of earnings forecasts, has a 
strong and positive influence on analyst optimism.  
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Together these results provide evidence suggesting that mentor optimism explains 
a substantial fraction of variation in analyst optimism. The findings offer strong support 
that analyst optimism is influenced by the optimism of their past mentors in their early 
careers (H1) and analysts are more optimistic if they work with optimistic mentors in 
their early careers (H1a). 
 
3.3.4 Influence of Optimistic and Pessimistic Mentors 
To examine the influence of optimistic and pessimistic mentors, I run the 
following logistic regressions: 
 
 
, 1 2 3 ,[Pr( | , )]  i t i i i tLogit Optimistic analyst X Optimistic mentors Optimistic mentors X Fixed effects e        (3) 
 
I define Optimistic Analysts as a dummy that takes one if an analyst is in the top 
quintile of a given optimism metric. Optimistic Mentors are defined in a similar fashion, 
taking one when mentor optimism is either in the top 10% or 20% in a given year. The 
major difference between Equations (2) and (3) is that all explanatory variables that enter 
into the logistic regressions are dummies to control for the potential impact resulting 
from the non-linearity in explanatory variables.45  
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports the impact of having optimistic mentors. Having 
mentors in the top 10% of optimistic mentors in an analyst’s early career increases his or 
her probability of becoming optimistic by the following marginal probabilities, all of 
which are statistically significant at reasonable levels: 8.097% on Strong Buys, 6.579% 
                                                 
45 This is similar to the approach used by Hong and Kubik (2003). Specifically, Equation (3) can be 
regarded as an extended version of Hong and Kubik’s approach, as I have included extra variables as 
control variables. In short, there are about 170 fixed effects in these logistic regressions (see the even-
numbered Columns in Table IV).  
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on Upgrade Jumps, 4.303% on Earnings Forecast Optimism, and 5.283% on Price 
Growth Optimism, respectively. Results (reported in the last two rows in Panel A) are 
weaker but similar if I apply an alternative definition of optimistic mentors: expanding 
optimistic mentors to include the top quintile (instead of top decile) only marginally 
weakens the results.46 
In addition to looking into optimistic mentors, I examine whether I would observe 
the direct opposite effect of pessimistic mentors. I interchange optimistic dependent 
dummies (mentors) with pessimistic dependent dummies (mentors) and re-run the 
baseline specifications. Logistic regression results reported in Panel B provide support 
that analysts are more likely to be pessimistic if they work with pessimistic mentors in 
their early careers. Except for Strong Buys, the estimated coefficients are all positive and 
statistically significant for six out of the eight regressions. Using an alternative definition 
of pessimistic mentors (including the top quintile instead of the top decile) makes the 
results, including the results on Strong Buys, even stronger. On average, analysts are 
2.982%-8.918% more likely to become pessimistic when they work with pessimistic 
analysts in their early careers. Panel C includes both optimistic and pessimistic mentors 
in logistic regressions, showing that as expected analysts are more likely to be influenced 
to be optimistic by early optimistic than pessimistic mentors. Unreported results are 
similar but slightly weaker if I use the alternative definitions based on top quintile. 
In addition to the findings above, results in Table 3.4 suggest that optimistic 
mentors have an asymmetrically stronger impact than pessimistic mentors. This is 
                                                 
46 In unreported results on Earnings Forecast Optimism, I find that protégés are more likely to become 
optimistic if their mentors are strong in earnings accuracy. Interacting the top 10% indicators on Mentor 
Earnings Forecast Accuracy and Mentor Earnings Forecast Optimism, the estimated marginal probability 
on the interaction term is 6.341%. In other words, strong mentors, who are both historically more accurate 
and optimistic, are more likely to influence analysts to become optimistic analysts than their weak 
counterparts. 
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suggested by the observation that the average marginal probabilities of optimistic 
mentors (7.20%-9.03% in Panel A) are larger than those of pessimistic mentors (4.98%-
6.18% in Panel B). One potential explanation is as follows: if analysts who self-select 
themselves into the equity analyst profession are more optimistic (than the average 
person) in general, they are more likely to be influenced by optimistic (rather than 
pessimistic) colleagues in their early careers.47 
In short, the above results suggest that the styles of early mentors have a strong 
influence on analysts’ styles. Analysts are more likely to be optimistic (pessimistic) if 
they work with optimistic (pessimistic) mentors in their early careers (H1b).  
 
3.3.5 Skills Spillover 
While the above sections provide evidence showing that analysts carry over their 
early career experience into their professional careers, this evidence focuses on whether 
analysts pick up the styles of their mentors. The next immediate question is whether 
analysts pick up the skills of their mentors. While skills in other professions may be 
harder to define, skills in the current context can be easily measured and compared by 
looking into the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. As such, I examine the spillover in 
forecast accuracy in this section to see whether analysts inherit the skills of their mentors. 
Table 3.5 reports the results of regressing analyst accuracy on mentor accuracy. 
The regression specifications are identical to those in Table 3.2 except the main 
dependent (Analyst Optimism) and independent variables (Mentor Optimism) are replaced 
with Analyst Accuracy and Mentor Accuracy, respectively. The regression results in 
                                                 
47 The idea is consistent with Seligman (1998), who shows that optimistic people are less influenced by 
negative events, as optimistic people tend to attribute these negative externalities to temporal, 
uncontrollable factors. 
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Table 3.5 suggest that there is little or no spillover in forecast accuracy as all of the 
estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant.  
Whereas the results suggest that there is no spillover in accuracy, there are two 
implications once we line up the results between optimism and accuracy spillover. First, 
while it is easy for analysts to pick up mentors’ styles, it is apparently harder for them to 
learn the skills of their mentors. It simply takes more time than the span of a first job for 
junior analysts to pick up the skills from their mentors. Second, these results are 
consistent with the main idea behind the study of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 
(1992) in which “individuals rapidly converge on one action on the basis of some but 
very little information” (p.994). In the current context, young analysts pick up the styles 
of their mentors even though they do not have complete information about their mentors’ 
actions. 
Here is an alternative interpretation of the above results: similar to the debate in 
the literature on active mutual fund managers,48 if sell-side analysts on average do not 
have superior abilities to forecast earnings, there should be no spillover in accuracy for 
average mentors to their mentees in general. As such, it is possible that only a handful of 
talented mentors can transfer their professional skills to their protégés. I examine this 
conjecture and conduct the following analysis. As prior literature shows that all-star 
analysts on average are more accurate in making earnings forecasts, I locate those all-star 
analysts by looking them up in the Institutional Investor analyst rankings. After 
constructing an All-Star Mentor dummy indicating whether at least one of the analyst’s 
mentors has ever been ranked as an all-star analyst in the Institutional Investor magazine 
since 1983, I interact mentor accuracy with this All-Star Mentor dummy. If analysts are 
                                                 
48 Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Carhart (1997), and Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005). 
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able to pick up skills from superior mentors, this interaction variable should be positive, 
reflecting that skilled mentors are more capable of passing their knowledge and skills to 
their protégés.  
Panel B reports these interaction results. The evidence suggests that all-star 
mentors are better at passing their superior skills to their protégés. The estimated 
coefficients of All-Star Mentor × Mentor Accuracy are at least more marginally 
statistically positive. A one standard deviation increase in All-Star Mentor × Mentor 
Accuracy leads to 1.575% to 4.014% increase in analyst accuracy, depending on the 
regression specifications.49 That would also translate into a 19.6% to 28.5% increase in 
analyst accuracy relative to the explanatory power (i.e., economic magnitude) of All-Star 
analyst indicator, which is economically meaningful and non-trivial. To better put these 
results into context, one should consider two stylized facts of all-star analysts. First, all-
star analysts are more accurate in earnings forecast than non-star analysts. Regressing 
analysts’ percentile-rank accuracy on all-star status gives a significantly positive 
coefficient (7.014% in standardized accuracy; t-stat: 19.10).50 Second, the superiority in 
forecast accuracy for all-star analysts persists, albeit weaker, even after the years when 
they are no longer voted as all-star analysts. Regressing an analyst’s percentile-rank 
accuracy on (a) all-star status and (b) an Ever Star dummy, which takes one whenever an 
analyst has ever been voted as all-star analysts, gives a significantly positive coefficient 
on Ever Star (5.523%; t-stat: 10.82). These stylized facts suggest that all-star analysts are 
in general more accurate than non-star analysts. Together with these two stylized facts, 
                                                 
49 The estimated coefficients of General experience and Firm-specific experience in both panels are all 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the analyst’s accuracy tends to increase if his or her 
professional or firm-specific experience increases. This is consistent with the findings of McNichols and 
O’Brien (1997), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999), Clement (1999), Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999), and 
Clement, Koonce, and Lopez (2007). 
50 This is also consistent with Stickel (1992), Leone and Wu (2007), and Fang and Yasuda (2010). 
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the results on interaction suggest that only talented all-star mentors, who are more 
accurate in earnings forecasts, are able to pass on their superior accuracy skills to their 
protégés. 
While prior studies suggest that accurate analysts are more likely to attain all-star 
analyst status (e.g., Stickel (1992), Leone and Wu (2007), and Fang and Yasuda (2010)), 
it is not clear whether having superior mentors would help their protégés attain the all-
star analyst status. I find that having mentors in analysts’ early careers make a substantial 
difference in their future professional development. Panel C in Table 3.5 reports the 
marginal probabilities from regressing all-star analyst dummy on a host of variables. The 
main variable of interest is Proportion of All-Star Mentors, which is defined as the 
proportion of all-star mentors in an analyst’s early career. These results suggest that 
having all-star mentors in one’s early career makes a big difference for the protégé’s 
subsequent career: analysts who have all-star mentors in their early careers are 5.933% 
more likely to be elected as all-star analysts than analysts with no star mentors, 
controlling for their accuracy, optimism, brokerage size, and other known analyst 
characteristics. If an analyst were to move from the 25th to the 75th Proportion of All-Star 
Mentors while other analyst characteristics remain constant, the analyst’s probability of 
being ranked as an all-star analyst increases by 1.48%. Sub-period results are fairly 
consistent as shown in Columns (3) and (4). Given that all specifications control for 
analyst accuracy, the incremental probabilities shown above are surprising as they 
indicate that reputation spills over from mentors to protégés. Thus, having all-star 
mentors in their early careers significantly impacts the protégés’ future professional 
success.51 
                                                 
51 The estimated marginal probabilities on analyst accuracy in Panel C are all positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that accurate analysts are more likely to be voted as all-star analysts. The results are 
consistent with those in Stickel (1992), Leone and Wu (2007), and Fang and Yasuda (2010). 
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Together these results provide additional insights into why numerous Wall Street 
brokerage houses spend enormous resources trying to recruit top-notch, all-star analysts 
from rival brokerage houses—attracting big stars (i) enhances the research quality of and 
(ii) spills over their reputation to those analysts in the hiring brokerage houses. The 
interesting contrast between style and skills spillover also leads to a more fundamental 
question on the mentorship system as a whole—are talented analysts born or made? On 
the one hand, optimism and accuracy spillover evidence suggests analysts only pick up 
the styles but not skills of their mentors, whereas only a subset of talented mentors are 
able to unwind this pattern to pass their forecast skills to their protégés. On the other 
hand, the evidence on reputation spillover is intriguing since analysts’ accuracy and other 
analyst-specific characteristics have been properly controlled for. A possible explanation 
for reputation spillover is that talented mentors transfer to their protégés skills that do not 
relate to forecast accuracy but are demanded by sophisticated institutional investors. 
 
3.3.6 Robustness Checks and Other Tests 
The following section summarizes the results of a battery of robustness checks, 
followed by the results of counterfactual simulation and additional analyses. 
 
3.3.6.1 Robustness Checks 
Table 3.6 reports the results of different robustness checks. “Active analysts only” 
focuses on active analysts who cover at least eight firms per year. The idea of active 
analysts is to see if the spillover in optimism merely results from analysts who have thin 
coverage in their research portfolios. The results are similar to the baseline results. 
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“After 1993” excludes forecasts made before year 1993 as prior studies suggest 
that pre-1993 IBES data may not become publicly available on a real-time basis and 
could be subject to a general delay (O’Brien (1988), Zitzewitz (2001)).52 Note that 
recommendation data are only available after 1993; as such, the “After 1993” test mainly 
focuses on the earnings forecast and price target data. The results reported in Table 3.6 
again are similar to the baseline results and are not driven by this potential timing 
problem. 
While there is a remote possibility that these style-based results on optimism 
spillover are driven by information disclosure, “After Regulation FD” examines this 
possibility and investigates whether the results are driven by the advanced disclosure to 
selective participants prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000.53 I show that 
the results based on the post-Reg FD sample are again similar to those baseline estimates. 
“Current brokerage house fixed effect” reports results controlling for current 
brokerage house fixed effects instead of first brokerage houses. The idea is to test 
whether optimistic analysts self-select themselves into optimistic brokerage houses. The 
results are again similar to those baseline estimates, thereby suggesting that these results 
on optimism spillover cannot be explained by self-selection of optimistic analysts into 
optimistic brokerage houses.54 
“Year of entry fixed effect” examines whether the optimism spillover reflects the 
initial labor market condition when analysts first enter into the sell-side analyst industry. 
A study by Oyer (2008) suggests that the initial job market condition, as proxied through 
                                                 
52 O’Brien (1988), Zitzewitz (2001), and Bernhardt, Campbello, and Kutsoati (2004). 
53 Gintschel and Markov (2004), Ke, Petroni, and Yu (2008), Bernile, Kumar, and Sulaeman (2011). 
54 While the alternative would be to include house optimism based on the contemporaneous optimism of 
the colleagues in current brokerage houses (i.e., house optimism), I do not pursue such a strategy since 
analyst and house optimism are clearly endogenous. As such, other estimated coefficients would be biased 
during estimation. 
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the stock market condition, could have a large impact on new MBA students seeking 
Wall Street employment; thus, I control for the year of entry to examine this possible 
hypothesis. Moreover, controlling for year of entry reveals whether the results are driven 
by the initial market sentiment when analysts first join the profession. As such, in the 
regressions I include “Year of first entry fixed effect,” which is a series of dummies each 
taking a value for the year when analysts first appear in the IBES dataset. Again, the main 
message of the baseline results remains unchanged after controlling for years of analysts’ 
first entries. 
“Year-sector fixed effects” includes year-sector fixed effects in regressions 
(instead of year fixed effects and sector fixed effects in baseline regressions). This check 
is motivated by anecdotal evidence that industry sentiment could be exceptionally high in 
certain periods (e.g., the technology bubble in the late 1990s).55 The results suggest that 
the baseline results are not driven by this concern.56 
“Fama-MacBeth (FM) regressions” report the regression results estimated using 
annual time-series cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. Except for year and 
first brokerage house fixed effects which are not included, the regressions for the annual 
FM regressions are identical to those in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Standard errors are adjusted 
using Newey-West (1987) with a 4-year lag. All results remain positive and significant 
under FM regressions. The economic magnitudes appear to be even stronger than those in 
the baseline results. Looking into the signs of estimated coefficients further reveals that a 
majority of the estimated coefficients are both positive and statistically significant.57 
                                                 
55 For instance, Brunnermeier and Nagel, (2004) and Griffin, Harris, Shu, and Topaloglu (2011). 
56 Except for Price Growth Optimism, unreported results show that all results remain robust even 
controlling for current brokerage house and sector fixed effects. 
57 Looking into analysts who move from the most (least) optimistic to the least (most) optimistic brokerage 
houses, I also examine whether they still carry their early career experience. However, as it is not common 
for such career moves in the sample, the thin sample does not offer sufficient observations for testing. 
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3.3.6.2 Counterfactual Simulation: Pseudo-Mentors Panel 
A potential explanation to the above results is that there is an unobserved, 
mechanical relationship underpinning analyst and mentor optimism. As previously 
mentioned, from econometrics standpoint a relationship is mechanical when a common 
component is present on both sides of a regression. While the main dependent (i.e., 
Mentor Optimism) and independent (i.e., Analyst Optimism) variables are based on 
completely different constructs, the impression that they share a common tag of 
“optimism” may raise concern that the above results are spurious. 
To tackle this concern, I exploit the panel on employment history and conduct the 
following counterfactual simulation: if there is a hard-wired relationship between analyst 
and mentor optimism, we should still observe strong results even when we assign 
analysts to random mentors. In contrast, if the strong results documented above arise 
from the mentor-protégé relationship but are not mechanical in nature, the results should 
disappear once we mix and match analysts with random mentors. As such, I conduct a 
randomized experiment using the following steps. First, I match analysts with mentors 
randomly drawn from the sample without replacement. The final deliverable is a 
simulated panel on employment history in which analysts are matched with Pseudo-
Mentors. Second, after assembling this pseudo-mentor panel, regressions are run with the 
optimism metrics of the pseudo-mentors (i.e., Pseudo-Mentor Optimism) with the control 
variables and fixed effects identical to those in preceding tables. Finally, I repeat this 
two-step randomization 1,000 times. 
Figure 3.3 further plots the distributions of estimated coefficients on Pseudo-
Mentor Optimism. In Figure 3.3 the distributions of estimated coefficients on Pseudo-
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Mentor Optimism largely cluster around zero (i.e., no systematic relationship). The 
average coefficients show that none of the estimated coefficients are significantly loaded 
(neither positive nor negative).58 In other words, the economic magnitudes from Pseudo-
Mentor Optimism on analyst optimism are on average non-existent. Together these 
findings suggest that the results documented above are not spurious in nature—i.e., not 
capturing an unobservable mechanical relation in the data—as the results generated under 
the pseudo-mentor panel are not even remotely similar. Moreover, they suggest that the 
nature of social ties between analysts and their mentors is unique and important in 
explaining the results of optimism spillover. 
 
3.3.6.3 Small Brokerage Houses: A Hybrid Estimation 
A potential objection to requiring mentors and protégés to cover the same sector 
is as follows: under the existing definition of mentors, it is harder for analysts who start 
their careers in small brokerage houses to have Mentors. Unlike large brokerage houses, 
small brokerage houses have comparatively limited resources and are less likely to 
engage in clear sector specialization. In other words, it is more likely for analysts in small 
brokerage houses to contemporaneously cover several sectors. The immediate 
consequence is that analysts in large houses could take a larger weight in the final 
sample. 
To address this potential concern, I re-design the regression specification. 
Specifically, for those small brokerage houses where analysts do not have mentors who 
cover the same sectors in their early careers, their missing mentor optimism metrics are 
                                                 
58 Specifically, the estimated coefficients are summarized as follows with t-statistics in parentheses: 
0.009% (0.01) for Strong Buys, -0.032% (-0.05) for Upgrade Jumps, -0.051% (-0.07) for Earnings 
Forecast Optimism, and 0.011% (0.01) for Price Growth Optimism. 
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replaced with the optimism metrics generated based on all other seniors regardless of 
whether they cover the same sectors. The idea of this “hybrid” mentor optimism is to 
determine to what extent the results are driven by the condition that both analysts and 
mentors are required to cover the same sectors. 
Panel A of Table 3.7 reports the baseline results estimated under this hybrid 
estimation for brokerage houses with fewer than five employees. In general, the results 
are similar to the baseline results if we include more analysts who start their careers in 
small brokerage houses. As such, the results suggest that optimism spillover is not driven 
by the research design where both analysts and mentors are required to cover the same 
sector. I also use alternative definitions of small brokerage house and report the results in 
Panel B. Again, results are generally similar: except for Strong Buys, the significance of 
other metrics generally decreases when the upper threshold of brokerage size increases. It 
is also interesting to note that in Panel B, once I include more “irrelevant” senior analysts 
who do not cover the same sector, the economic magnitudes of the spillover gradually 
decrease. Similar to the results reported under the counterfactual simulation in Online 
Appendix 3, this pattern suggests that there is a unique mentor-protégé relationship that 
plays an important role in explaining the economic channel of optimism spillover. 
In short, the results in Table 3.7 suggest that the findings above are not driven by 




3.3.6.4 Location Proximity 
As large brokerage houses may maintain branches, one potential concern is that 
mentors and their protégés could work in different cities. If this were the case, it would be 
more difficult for protégés to learn from their mentors through daily social interactions.  
To address this concern, I first hand-collect brokerage house locations in Nelson’s 
Directory of Investment Research. Figure 3.4 is a snapshot of brokerage house location 
(including all headquarters and branches) at the end of 2008. Over 60% of those 1,913 
analysts employed by 193 brokerage houses are situated in four major financial hubs: 
New York (51.5%), San Francisco (7.4%), Chicago (3.5%), and Boston (3.3%), 
respectively. Specifically, 65% of brokerage houses have their analysts situated in their 
houses’ headquarters, regardless of whether they maintain branches. The concentration 
may indicate the advantage of information pooling. Moreover, the estimated coefficient 
from regressing the number of branches on the number of analysts is 0.074 (t-6.37). If 
House A hires 10 more analysts than rival House B, the former is expected to have 0.7 
more branches than the latter.59 
 
To further address this concern, I conduct a simple inference exercise. If location 
proximity between mentors and protégés inversely influences optimism spillover (i.e., 
long distance leading to weaker optimism spillover), results should be weaker in the 
                                                 
59 While it may be possible to hand-match each analyst from Nelson’s to IBES, there are a few empirical 
challenges. First, as Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research only provides detailed location data on or 
after 1996, a substantial portion of data prior to 1996 would be dropped from the matched sample. Second, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that sell-side analysts are highly geographically mobile. For instance, “A 
typical hard-charging analyst also spends approximately one-third of his or her time traveling, often on 
marathon trips to multiple cities and hard-to-reach corporate headquarters. Eighteen-hour days are routine. 
Analysts make dozens of phone calls a day to sources and clients. And they work under extreme pressure.” 
(Groysberg (2010, p.36)). In addition, my recollection of a discussion with two ex-analysts in a prestigious 
investment bank also indicates that Wall Street analysts generally maintain close contact with their 
colleagues in other branches through emails or telephone calls. As such, the concern about location 
proximity is valid, but it should have minimal impact. 
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subsample of large brokerage houses. This is because large houses are more likely to 
have branches than small rivals. In contrast, if the results are not driven by the concern of 
location proximity, the results should be similar based on this subsample of large 
brokerage houses. 
The estimated results are summarized in Figure 3.5. The left (right) panel reports 
subsample results based on large houses with at least 25 (50) analysts.60 In general, the 
results are fairly similar to those reported above, except for Earnings Forecast Optimism 
displayed in green squares. This is not entirely surprising as prior studies show that 
analysts in large brokerage houses tend to make more accurate earnings forecasts due to a 
rich information or resource environment (e.g., Clement (1999)). As such, sub-sampling 
only large houses effectively removes much of the variation in Earnings Forecast 
Optimism by analysts in small brokerage houses. In short, while location proximity is a 
valid concern, the results reported above are not driven by this potential concern. 
 
3.3.6.5 Other Tests: Diffusion of Early Influence, Absolute Optimism, and 
Gender 
The results of several unreported tests are summarized as follows. To examine 
whether past influence would diffuse through time as analysts become more experienced, 
I interact year of general experience with mentor optimism in baseline regressions in 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3. As the signs of the estimated coefficient on this interaction term are 
mixed and weak, the results suggest that past mentorship experience is persistent in 
influencing analyst optimism without a clear trend of diffusion. This is consistent with 
the finding in Malmendier and Nagel (2011a), who show that, while individuals tend to 
                                                 
60 The 25-analyst threshold is motivated by the raw data. Specifically, the maximum number of analysts 
who work in brokerage houses that do not maintain any branches is 26 analysts.  
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place more weight on recent stock market experience, the “memory of these early 
experience fades away only slowly” (p.391). 
I also examine whether mentors influence analysts’ absolute earnings forecast 
optimism (i.e., optimism earnings forecasts to the actual earnings but not relative to 
peers). Specifically, I replace Earnings Forecast Optimism with Absolute Earnings 
Forecast Optimism and run the identical baseline specifications. The estimated 
coefficient on Absolute Earnings Forecast Optimism is 0.911% (t-stat: 1.05). It is not 
entirely surprising due to the underlying construct of absolute optimism: analysts can all 
be “optimistic” as long as their earnings forecasts are above realized earnings. In short, 
the evidence suggests that relative but not absolute optimism is influenced by the 
optimism of past mentors. 
I test whether all-star analysts are less influenced by their mentors. Specifically, I 
interact all-star analyst status in Institutional Investor magazines with mentor optimism 
and run the baseline regressions with this extra interaction term.61 In a related vein, I also 
track those mentors who have ever been ranked as all-star analysts and interact this data 
with mentor optimism. While these conjectures are intuitive, the results indicate that there 
is no evidence suggesting that all-star analysts would be differently affected by their 
mentor optimism in their early careers, regardless of whether or not their mentors are all-
star analysts.  
Motivated by a recent study by Kumar (2009), who shows that female analysts are 
more accurate in the male-dominated analyst industry, I also test whether there is any 
gender-related differential of optimism spillover. Specifically, using the manually 
                                                 
61 In particular, I look into analysts before or after they are elected as all-star analysts. I also examine 
analysts who have ever been ranked as all-star analysts.  
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collected gender data on sell-side analysts,62 I find some weak evidence indicating that a 
high proportion of female mentors in analysts’ early careers would partially unwind the 
pattern of optimism spillover.63 However, while the signs of all estimated coefficients are 
unanimously negative, only one of the four optimism metrics is statistically significant. I 
also interact female dummy with female mentor dummy/numeric variable to examine any 
differential in optimism spillover. However, the results are again weak and mixed. As 
such, there is no consistent evidence that the gender composition of mentors would cast 
any significant effect on the optimism spillover results documented above. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates whether analysts’ past experience influences their 
professional careers. The key conjecture of the mentorship experience hypothesis is that 
analyst optimism should exhibit a systematic relationship to the optimism of the mentors 
with whom protégés work in their early careers. Analysts are expected to be more 
optimistic if they work with optimistic mentors. The key innovation is to use mentor 
optimism, which is a snapshot taken of the analysts’ first job in the industry, as an 
instrument to examine the influence of past mentorship experience on analysts’ future 
optimism. If protégés are influenced by their mentors in their early careers, there should 
be a positive and systematic relationship between past mentor optimism and future 
analyst optimism. 
                                                 
62 My thanks to Alok Kumar for sharing the analyst-gender data. 
63 Specifically, the estimated coefficients on the proportion of female mentors are as follows: Strong Buys 
(-2.972%, t-stat: -2.31), Upgrade Jumps (-1.736%, t-stat:-1.24), Earnings Forecast Optimism (-0.922%, t-
stat: -0.67), and Price Growth Optimism (-0.929%, t-stat: -0.44).  
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I find evidence suggesting that past mentorship experience has a strong and 
visible influence on analysts’ professional styles. Analysts are more optimistic if they 
first work with optimistic analysts in their early careers: they are more optimistic in 
earnings forecasts and price targets, issue more strong buy recommendations and upgrade 
jumps. Analysts are also more likely to be influenced by their optimistic mentors than by 
pessimistic ones.  
While it is easy for analysts to pick up their mentors’ styles, it is harder for them 
to learn the skills of their mentors, as there is no spillover in forecast accuracy. Only 
talented superstar mentors are exceptions to this pattern, passing their superior skills and 
reputation to their protégés. The market is smart in identifying the protégés of optimistic 
mentors given that the short-run market reaction to their revisions is weaker. 
Collectively, these results suggest that early mentorship experience has a strong 








CHAPTER 4:  MARKET REACTION, SMART INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS, AND SELF SELECTION TESTS 
4.1 Introduction 
While the above sections show evidence suggesting a strong spillover in 
optimism, it remains unclear as to whether investors would care about the visible 
influence of mentors on their protégés. Even if they do care, it also not entirely clear as to 
whether the market is capable of identifying optimistic analysts based on their early 
career experience. In this section, I directly address these questions by examining 
whether the market is smart in identifying the protégés of optimistic analysts (H2). 
Moreover, the central question now boils down to whether the systematic pattern 
in optimism spillover is driven by either selection effect or treatment effect. If the pattern 
described above is explained by selection effect, the results would be interpreted as 
selection of optimistic analysts into optimistic brokerage houses in their first jobs. On the 
other hand, if the results are explained by treatment effect, the results would then support 
the hypothesis that early mentorship experience has a long-lasting influence on analysts’ 
future professional optimism. Without a doubt, the perfect scenario to gauge the 
economic impact of treatment effect would involve a random assignment of identical 
equity analysts to random groups and measure their future optimism down the road.64 
Given that such a natural experiment is generally absent in the Wall Street analyst 
profession, this chapter proceeds forward to establish the causal link between early 
mentorship experience and future professional styles via the adoption of a host of 
identification strategies and empirical exercises. 
                                                 
64 For instance, economic studies rely on random assignment of college roommates (Sacerdote (2001), 
Zimmerman (2003)) to estimate the economic impact of peer effect. More specifically, natural experiments 
refer to “situations where the forces of nature or government policy have conspired to produce an 
environment somewhat akin to a randomized experiment” (Angrist and Krueger (2001)). 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 summarizes the 
results on market reaction to the forecast revisions made by the protégés of optimistic 
mentors. Section 4.3 provides further robustness checks showing that the results are not 
driven by analyst self-selection. Section 4.4 concludes this chapter. 
 
4.2 Smart Market 
Following Gleason and Lee (2003), I run the following regression specification to 
examine the market reaction to earnings revision:65 
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(4) 
The dependent variable, Adj. Returni,j,t, refers to the size-adjusted cumulative 
return to the revision made by analyst i for firm j at time t in the windows of [-1,+1], [-
1,+3], [-1,+5], or [-1,+10].66 Similar to Table 3.2, Optimistic Mentors is a dummy 
variable that takes one when Mentor Optimism in Earnings Forecast Optimism is in the 
top decile in a given year.67 Revision Signal is a discrete variable that takes the value of 
+1 (-1) if an analyst’s revision is both above (below) his or her own prior forecast and the 
prior consensus for firm j, and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest is the 
interaction term of Optimistic Mentors × Revision Signal. The primary hypothesis is that, 
if the market cares about the visible influence of mentors on their protégés and is capable 
of identifying the protégés of optimistic mentors, this interaction term should be negative. 
                                                 
65 This regression specification is similar to those in Jiang, Kumar, and Law (2011). The dataset is also 
drawn from their study. 
66 The size-adjusted cumulative return is the buy-and-hold return of firm j for which the revision is made 
minus the buy-and-hold return for an equal-weighted portfolio of firms in the same NYSE size decile 
formed at the beginning of each year. 
67 I will also describe results based on an alternative definition of the top quintile. 
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In contrast, if the market is not able to or does not differentiate analysts based on their 
past mentors, we should observe no differential in this interaction term. 
Similar to those regressions in prior sections, this regression includes a wide set of 
control variables to control for analyst characteristics and differences in information 
environment. Specifically, the control variables include all-star dummy, book-to-market 
ratio, brokerage size, days since last forecast, days to year-end, forecast frequency, firm 
size, firm-specific experience, general experience, institutional ownership, lag accuracy, 
6-month momentum, number of analysts, number of companies, and number of 
industries. Moreover, all regressions control for time and firm-specific variations by 
including year and firm fixed effects. 
The market reaction results are reported in Table 4.1.68 The results indicate that 
the market generally responds more weakly to the revisions made by analysts who have 
optimistic mentors. All estimated coefficients on the interaction term, Optimistic Mentors 
× Revision Signal, are significantly negative. The estimated coefficients range from -
0.257% (t-stat: -1.98, Column (2)) to -0.489% (t-stat: -4.10, Column (1)), depending on 
regression specifications and control variables. In economic terms, the market discounts 
the revisions made by the protégés of optimistic mentors by 15-23 basis points. When 
constructing the optimistic mentor dummy, using an alternative definition based on the 
top quintile slightly weakens the results (in the last two rows of Panel A). In Panel B, 
where the pessimistic mentor dummy is included, there is no evidence that the market 
discounts their revisions since the interaction term Pessimistic Mentors × Revision Signal 
are negative but not statistically significant. In short, the market is smart enough to 
identify the analysts of extremely optimistic mentors and discounts their revisions 
                                                 
68 To conserve space, the estimated coefficients of these 19 control variables are summarized in Appendix 
5.  
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accordingly. A potential explanation is that the market in general does not trust the 
protégés of analysts with extreme views; this interpretation is consistent with the idea of 
trust in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008). 
Recent studies show that smart institutional investors take analysts’ characteristics 
and bias into account when incorporating the information in analysts’ revisions 
(Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), Hugon and Muslu (2010), Jiang, Kumar, and 
Law (2011)). Specifically, sophisticated institutional investors demand conservative 
analysts and tend to unwind the optimism bias embed in earnings forecasts made by 
optimistic analysts. Motivated by these findings, I examine which group of investors is 
the main driver for the discounting. To address this question, I first sort all observations 
into terciles (i.e., high, mid, and low) based on their institutional ownership a quarter 
prior to the revisions. In Panel C, where these subsample results are reported, the results 
suggest that institutional investors play a main role in discounting the revisions made by 
the protégés of optimistic mentors. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on Optimistic 
Mentor Dummy × Revision Signal are all negative and statistically significant across all 
short-run event windows, ranging from -0.566% (t-stat: -2.67) to -0.888 (t-stat: -4.20) in 
the high institutional ownership bin. While the estimated coefficients are negative in mid 
and low institutional ownership bins, they are not statistically significant. In economic 
terms, sophisticated institutional investors discount the revisions made by the protégés of 
optimistic mentors by 33-38 basis points. These results provide clear evidence that 
sophisticated institution investors substantially discount the revisions made by the 
protégés of optimistic mentors, regardless of the direction of revisions. 
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4.3 Treatment Effect vs. Selection Effect 
This section summarizes a wide set of falsification and empirical exercises to 
disentangle selection effect and treatment effect. The tests reported below indicate that 
the results are not driven by analyst self-selection. 
  
4.3.1 Unobserved Brokerage House Culture and Incentives 
There are cross-sectional differences in optimism at the brokerage house level. 
First, brokerage houses exhibit heterogeneous levels of optimism as they face difference 
incentives or reputation concerns (Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)). Second, houses 
with a firm-specific culture or organization style exhibit distinct levels of optimism 
(Groysberg, Lee, and Nanda (2008), Cronqvist, Low, and Nilsson (2009), Parson and 
Titman (2009)). As brokerage house culture and incentives are generally persistent over 
time, a potential explanation for the above results is that they merely capture this 
persistent component. To absorb this cross-sectional difference in firm culture or 
incentives, all regression results in the above sections have controlled for first brokerage 
house fixed effects. As further shown in robustness checks, results remain robust even 
after controlling for current brokerage house fixed effects. These results collectively 
suggest that the optimism spillover documented above cannot be explained by differences 
in the unobserved brokerage house culture or incentive structures. 
 
4.3.2 Reverse Spillover from Juniors 
A potential question is whether the above results merely document a correlation 
but not causality. In other words, so far there is no clear evidence showing optimism 
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spillover from mentors to analysts. As such, it is possible that the professional styles of 
veteran analysts are influenced by junior apprentices (i.e., a reverse causality argument). 
To address these concerns, I conduct additional analyses as follows. Instead of 
identifying the Mentors of each analyst, I track down the Juniors of the analysts who 
would be defined as Mentors. In contrast to Mentors, Juniors are those colleagues who 
work in the same brokerage house (i.e., same house), who cover the same sector (i.e., 
same team), but have fewer years of professional experience (i.e., rookies) during 
analysts’ early careers. While this identification strategy is clear and intuitive, the 
immediate downside is that it is harder to find juniors in analysts’ early careers due to the 
pyramid-shaped organization structure. As such, analysts without corresponding Juniors 
in their early careers would automatically be excluded from the final sample. This is 
especially important as, for instance, analysts may work for only a year in their first 
brokerage house and leave, whereas the first brokerage house does not fill the vacancy 
until years later. To get around this problem, I re-design the sample and increase the 
sample size by including analysts who join the same house in the same year. Similar to 
mentor optimism, junior optimism is measured in analysts’ early careers to preserve 
comparability. The following augmented specification is run: 
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If there is a reverse spillover in which optimism spills from junior to senior 
analysts, we should observe a strong and positive coefficient on β1. In contrast, if analysts 
are not influenced by junior analysts in their early careers, we should not observe any 
systematic differences in β1.  
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The above specification also permits us to address the self-selection hypothesis. 
The idea is as follow: if the results on optimism spillover are driven by self-selection, 
optimistic juniors should also self-select themselves into optimistic brokerage houses in 
their first jobs. If this is the case, the estimated coefficient on Junior Optimism should be 
significantly positive. If self-selection cannot explain the systematic spillover in 
optimism between Analyst Optimism and Mentor Optimism, we should again not observe 
any systematic difference in β1. 
Panel C of Table 4.2 reports the regression estimates of Junior Optimism. The 
first subpanel reports the baseline regression results where analysts who join the same 
house in the same year are counted as Juniors, whereas the second subpanel excludes 
analysts who join the same house in the same year. None of the eight Junior Optimism 
regressions offer significant evidence that there is a reverse spillover from young to 
senior analysts. In both panels, the estimated coefficients on Junior Optimism are not 
statistically significant in any of the four baseline regressions. While a potential objection 
is that the power of the test may be weakened because the sample size substantially 
shrinks due to the identification of juniors, the estimated coefficients on Mentor 
Optimism are reasonably robust. First, in four out the eight regressions the estimated 
coefficients on Mentor Optimism are positive and statistically significant. Second, in all 
eight regressions the signs of Mentor Optimism are positive, which stands in contrast to 
the estimates of Junior Optimism.69 
 
                                                 
69 The average correlation between junior and mentor optimism is 0.381, whereas the average correlation 
between junior and analyst optimism is 0.130. Moreover, in an unreported test, I further relax the 
construction of Earnings Forecast Optimism and deviate from Hong and Kubik’s (2003) approach by not 
requiring Earnings Forecast Optimism to be computed on a three-year rolling window. Again, there is no 
evidence of reverse spillover from juniors to senior analysts (estimate: 2.043%, t-stat: 1.28). 
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4.3.3 Span of First Jobs 
Motivated by prior economic studies which show that the length of on-the-job 
experience has a strong economic influence on labor wages (Lynch (1992), Dustmann 
and Meghir (2005)), I exploit the variation in the length of the first job to examine the 
influence of mentorship experience. Specifically, if analysts are influenced by their on-
the-job learning experience, we should expect a stronger influence from those analysts 
who stay longer in their first jobs. However, if the results are explained by self-selection, 
there should not be a systematic difference in optimism spillover depending on the 
duration of analysts’ first jobs. 
Panel D of Table 4.2 sorts analysts based on the duration of their first jobs. For 
analysts who spent two or more years in their first jobs, the results remain robust across 
different optimism metrics. In contrast, there is no systematic pattern for those analysts 
who spent one year or less in their first jobs. While Upgrade Jumps for this group of 
analysts remain significantly positive, there is no systematic pattern for the remaining 
optimism metrics. In short, the results indicate that optimism spillover is stronger for 
analysts who have a longer tenure in their first jobs and suggest that the results are 
influenced by their on-the-job learning experience. 
 
4.3.4 Brokerage house sizes 
I further exploit the size of initial brokerage houses to isolate between self-
selection and treatment effects. The idea is that junior analysts who start their jobs in 
large brokerage houses simply have more mentors to pick and choose from to begin with. 
If self-selection is true, the estimated coefficients based on subsamples of brokerage sizes 
should be stronger (weaker) for larger (smaller) brokerage houses. 
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Figure 4.1 plots the estimated coefficients of subsamples based on brokerage size. 
Panel A divides the sample by increments of five analysts (from small houses of five 
analysts to large houses of 20 analysts). There are two obvious observations. First, the 
estimated coefficients for large brokerage houses are not necessarily the strongest. Except 
for Strong Buys, the estimated coefficients are stronger for smaller brokerage houses. 
Second, there is no obvious upward trend in estimated coefficients once we move from 
small to large brokerage houses (i.e., from left to right). Panel B of Figure 4.1 further 
compares the smallest (fewer than five analysts) and the biggest brokerage houses (more 
than fifty analysts). A similar observation is made: the estimated coefficients based on 
larger brokerage houses are not necessarily stronger. Collectively, these results again 
suggest that the findings documented above cannot be explained by self-selection. 
 
4.3.5 Other Self-Selection Tests: Mentor Characteristics and Industry 
Specialization 
Potential competing hypotheses are that there is self-selection on observable 
mentor characteristics or industry specialization. Results reported in Online Appendix 4 
and 5 rule out these alternative hypotheses.70 
In short, approached from different angles, the above results show no evidence of 
reverse causality; instead, they point to the following two conclusions. First, the evidence 
suggests a clear economic channel of causality in which protégés are influenced by their 
senior mentors in their early careers. Second, the results indicate that the systematic 
pattern shown above cannot be explained by analysts’ self-selection in their early careers. 
                                                 
70 Running baseline regressions with mentor fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant 
mentor characteristics have also been examined. As much of the variation in analyst optimism is absorbed 
by the high dimensional mentor fixed effects (e.g., 1,000-2,000 mentor dummies) and the main sample at 




I first show that the market generally responds more weakly to the revisions made 
by analysts who have optimistic mentors by 15-23 basis points within 10-day window. 
More specifically, sophisticated institutional investors are the main driver for this 
discounting: they discount the revisions made by the protégés of optimistic mentors by 
33-38 basis points within 10-day window. These results provide clear evidence that the 
market, especially sophisticated investors, cares about the personal characteristics of 
analysts when digesting their forecast revisions. 
Moreover, a wide set of falsification tests and econometric exercise show that 
these results on optimism spillover cannot be explained by selection of analysts into 
optimistic brokerage houses in their first jobs. More specifically, competing hypotheses 
including unobserved brokerage firm culture, common portfolio coverage between 
mentors and protégés, analysts self-selecting into mentors based on their historical 
optimism, and industry self-selection cannot explain the spillover. Furthermore, 
subsamples based on brokerage sizes also show no systematic evidence on self-selection. 
In addition to the above, analyses show that there is no reverse spillover in 
optimism from juniors to their mentors, suggesting a clear causality channel that analysts 
learn their mentors’ styles, but not vice versa. The lack of reverse spillover also suggests 
that the systematic pattern in optimism spillover cannot be explained by analysts’ self-
selection in their early careers. Additional tests examining the span of analysts’ first jobs 
also show that the spillover is stronger among those analysts who spend a longer time 
with their mentors in their first jobs, thereby supporting the conclusion that analysts are 






CHAPTER 5:  HARD-TIMES ANALYSTS  
5.1 Introduction 
An increasing number of economics and finance studies shows that the 
macroeconomic environment has a long-lasting influence on individuals’ future decision 
making. Schoar and Zuo (2011) find that CEOs who start their first careers in recessions 
face more difficulty experiencing favorable job separation and adopt more conservative 
corporate strategies. Oyer (2006; 2008) shows that the stock market condition strongly 
determines whether MBA graduates get their first jobs on Wall Street. A number of 
economic studies also show that the initial labor market condition has a long-lasting 
impact on graduates’ future earnings and career paths71; however, little is known about 
whether the style and skills of managers depend on the macroeconomic environment 
when they first start their manager roles. 
In this paper, I use the analyst profession as a setting to examine the above 
hypothesis. Using cyclical labor market as exogenous shocks, this study asks whether 
sell-side analysts differ in their style and skills depending on cyclical shocks in the labor 
market when they first start their analyst roles. As managers of their portfolios, young 
analysts not only start issuing stock recommendations under their own names, they also 
start developing their own specific human capital through on-the-job learning experience. 
The first time that analysts put their reputation on the line provides an ideal setting and is 
a clear career milestone to examine this “first time manager” hypothesis. If the 
macroeconomic environment has a formative impact on their style and skills, we should 
                                                 
71 For example, Khan (2006) and Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2011) show that initial labor 
market conditions have a long-lasting impact on graduates’ future earnings and career advancement. In a 
similar vein, Law (2012) also demonstrates that early career mentors have a long-lasting influence on 
analysts’ future style but not their accuracy. In the personal domain, Malmendier and Nagel (2011a) show 
that depression-era babies are less willing to take financial risks in the future. 
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observe a systematic relationship between the macroeconomic condition during their 
early macroeconomic careers and future performance. 
The findings in this paper show an intricate dynamic between early 
macroeconomic experience and analysts’ long-term style and skills. First, analysts who 
start their careers in recession times (i.e., recession analysts) are more pessimistic in their 
forecasts than non-recession cohorts by 3.147%-4.335% in standardized forecast 
optimism, which is not economically trivial when compared to other known determinants 
identified in the prior literature. Second, their forecast accuracy is lower than non-
recession cohorts by 4.176%-7.006% in standardized forecast accuracy. These results 
persist after controlling for a wide host of known variables that affect analyst 
performance and remain robust under a series of robustness tests. Moreover, as a result of 
low forecast accuracy, recession analysts are less likely than their non-recession cohorts 
to become all-star analysts in the future by about 2%. On the contrary, while boom 
analysts are shown to be more optimistic in their future careers, they are not necessarily 
more accurate in their forecasting. Moreover, the optimism of boom analysts is short-
lived and, unlike recession analysts, reverses in the short run. 
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, the 
evidence suggests that the initial labor market condition has a long-lasting impact on 
analysts’ future performance and style. Understanding the impact of analysts’ formative 
experience on their information dissemination is important, as it helps us to identify the 
main economic determinants of their style, performance, and belief formation. Second, 
these findings complement Schoar and Zuo (2011), as the identification strategy in this 
paper exploits the actual timing when analysts first assume their analyst roles. Unlike 
typical cohort studies, the results in this paper are unlikely to be driven by the 
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endogenous timing of graduation, as first-time analysts have been working for years 
before they begin coverage of their own companies.  
The evidence in this study also sheds light on the interaction between firm-
specific human capital development and labor market dynamics. As analysts work for a 
number of years before becoming promoted to lead analysts, the above findings suggest 
that firm-specific promotion dynamics are endogenous to time-varying business cycles. 
The type of analyst being promoted is endogenously determined based on the prevailing 
labor market conditions. Pessimistic (Optimistic) analysts are more likely to be promoted 
in bad (good) economic times. Prior studies have suggested that sell-side analysts bow to 
pressure, as different brokerage houses have different incentive structures or cultures, and 
analysts face different career concerns depending on the stage of their career. The finding 
that recession analysts hold onto their pessimistic view and do not exhibit any reversal in 
future careers suggests that there is an unobserved characteristic among recession 
analysts. Comparing this evidence with the finding that the optimism of boom analysts is 
short-lived, these results collectively indicate an unobserved heterogeneous difference in 
belief formation between these two types of cohorts. Moreover, these findings echo the 
general consensus in economic studies, where recession experience is shown to leave a 
more remarkable imprint on individuals than boom experience (e.g., Malmendier and 
Nagel (2011a, 2011b)). 
The asymmetric impact of early macroeconomic experience on forecast accuracy 
between boom and recession analysts also points to another unobserved heterogeneity in 
information dissemination across these two groups. More specifically, the fact that 
recession analysts hold onto their pessimistic views has a detrimental impact on their 
future performance. On the other hand, as boom analysts are able to adjust or unwind 
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their initial optimism over time, their early labor market condition does not seem to have 
any long-lasting impact on their future skills development. 
This paper is related to a number of recent papers analyzing the impact of past 
experience on individuals’ future decision makings. For example, studies have examined 
corporate financial policies (Graham and Narasimhan (2004), Graham, Harvey, and Puri 
(2010)), 401(k) savings (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, Metrick (2009)), inflation expectation 
(Malmendier and Nagel (2011b)), stock market or IPO entry decisions (Kaustia and 
Knüpfer (2008), Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman (2011)), investment and savings 
decisions (Puri and Robinson (2007), Osili and Paulson (2008)), aggregate consumption 
(Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007)), trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008)), and 
the investment strategies of mutual fund managers (Greenwood and Nagel (2009)).  
The closest study to this paper is Khang (2011). The primary difference is that 
Khang (2011) focuses on the impact of recession on accuracy. Using quantile regression, 
Khang shows that recession cohorts are more accurate at certain quantiles in their first 
and the third years, but there is no differential in analysts’ accuracy in the long-run. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 summarizes the sample 
data and methodology. Section 5.3 discusses the main results. Conclusions are in Section 
5.4. 
 
5.2 Sample and Methodology 
All earnings per share (EPS) forecasts are obtained from Thomson Reuter’s IBES 
dataset. All earnings forecasts used in the study are based on unadjusted earnings 
forecasts between 1983 and 2010. As prior studies suggest that the coverage in the IBES 
database is thin and incomplete prior to 1983, I focus on those analysts who first appear 
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in IBES on or after 1984 (O’Brien (1988), Zitzewitz (2001)). Following Clement (1999) 
and Hong and Kubik (2003), the sample focuses on the last firm-year forecasts issued by 
analysts at least 30 days, but not more than one year, before the fiscal year-end. All 
forecasts and recommendations are merged with the Center for Research on Security 
Prices to obtain relevant stock prices. Consistent with prior studies, an analyst first starts 
his or her career when the analyst’s first earnings forecast is recorded in IBES.  
 
Following Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) and Hong and Kubik (2003), the 
main metric on forecast optimism is the percentile-rank optimism. An analyst’s Earnings 
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  
 (6) 
Rank of forecast error is a rank variable based on the rank of an analyst’s forecast 
error depending on one-year-ahead EPS forecasts. The most (least) optimistic analyst 
covering stock j in time t would be given the first (last) rank. The most optimistic 
(pessimistic) analyst would score 100 (0) in Forecast optimism. As this metric is 
conditional on the same firm-year, this is identical to controlling for firm-year fixed 
effects. Following Hong and Kubik (2003), an analyst must have at least three years of 
experience prior to being included in the sample, and the above measure is calculated on 
a three-year rolling window. Moreover, analysts are also required to cover at least three 
firms in any given year to ensure that the results are not driven by extreme values, as is 
commonly observed across young analysts who have thin portfolio coverage. 
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Similar to the above metric, Forecast accuracy is relative (to analyst peers) in 
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In other words, the most (least) accurate analysts would score 100 (0) in Forecast 
accuracy.72 
 
5.3 Main Results 
In this section, I first provide a brief descriptive statistics summary, followed by 
the main results. 
 
5.3.1 Brief Statistics Summary 
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables in this study. 
Approximately 22% of first-time analysts start their jobs in hard times. Recession 
analysts are more pessimistic (0.69 percentile; t-stat: 3.64) and less accurate (1.12 
percentile; t-stat: 5.80). They are 2% less likely to ever become all-star analysts, cover 
more companies, issue forecasts closer to fiscal year-ends, and cover stocks with less 
                                                 
72 Hong and Kubik (2003) show that from 1983 to 2000 an analyst’s relative optimism and accuracy are 
negatively correlated (about -0.18), which I am able to replicate (correlation: -0.162); however, an analyst’s 
relative optimism and accuracy are not necessarily negatively correlated by design. A simple example 
would illustrate this point. Assume two analysts (A and B) make forecast errors of +0.5 and -0.5, 
respectively. While they both score 100 in percentile-rank accuracy, analyst A (B) would score 100 (0) in 
percentile-rank optimism. In other words, an analyst’s relative optimism and accuracy are not necessarily a 
hard-wired relationship. Raw data also suggest a similar conjecture, as the correlation of optimism and 
accuracy is positive (correlation: 0.0783) from 2001 to 2010.  
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analyst coverage. More specifically, recession cohorts usually start their jobs in larger 
brokerage houses (5 more analysts in their first jobs; t-stat: 3.94) and move to smaller 
brokerage houses in their subsequent careers. 
 
5.3.2 Baseline Specifications 
To examine whether analyst are influenced by their early labor market experience, 
I run the following baseline panel regression: 
 
, 1 2 3 ,  i t i i tForecast Optimism Recsseion X Fixed Effects e         (8) 
For each analyst i in year t, I regress the analyst i's forecast optimism on 
Recession dummy, a k-vector a (K×1) of control variables (X), and a set of fixed effects 
controlling for differences in information environments. Recession is an indicator that 
takes one when an analyst first appears in the IBES dataset as a lead analyst during the 
recession years. The main coefficient of interest is β1 as it captures the influence of the 
early labor market’s influence on analysts’ future styles and performance.  
A similar regression specification is run to determine analysts’ forecast accuracy:  
 
, 1 2 3 ,  i t i i tForecast A ccuracy Recsseion X Fixed Effects e         (9) 
X is a wide selection of control variables including analyst characteristics or other 
variables that have been shown in prior literature to have an influence on forecast 
optimism and accuracy. They include number of companies, number of industries, 
general experience, firm-specific experience, all-star analyst status, the proportion of 
affiliated clients (Underwriting), days to year-end (O’Brien (1988), Klein (1990), 
Clement (1999), Clement and Tse (2005)), and firm coverage (i.e., the average analyst 
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coverage of an analyst’s portfolio of firms) (Hong and Kubik (2003)). To address the 
concern that optimism metrics are likely to be correlated within analysts, all standard 
errors are clustered at either analyst-year or analyst level. 
  
5.3.3 Analyst Forecast Optimism and Accuracy 
The baseline results on forecast optimism are reported in Table 5.2.  
In Table 5.2, the main dependent variable is Forecast Optimism. Across all 
specifications, there is a strong systematic pattern showing that recession analysts are 
more pessimistic than their peers in their future professional careers while controlling for 
other known factors. The coefficients are all significantly negative, ranging from -3.147% 
(t-stat: -2.61) to -4.335% (t-stat:-3.64), depending on regression specifications.73 As the 
dependent and independent variables (except dummy) have been standardized with zero 
mean zero and unit standard deviation, it is easy to interpret the economic magnitudes of 
these estimated coefficients: recession analysts are more pessimistic than non-recession 
cohorts by 3.147%-4.335% in standardized Forecast Optimism, which is not 
economically small when compared to other known determinants.  
The baseline results on forecast accuracy are reported in Table 5.3. The main 
dependent variable is Forecast Accuracy. The estimated coefficients on Recession across 
all regression specifications are statistically negative, ranging from -4.176 (-4.04) to -
7.006 (-5.80). In other words, recession cohorts are less accurate than non-recession 
cohorts by 4.176%-7.006% in standardized Forecast Accuracy, depending on the 
                                                 
73 The results in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 are not affected by the computation of standard error. Standard errors 
are similar but larger if they are duly clustered at year and analyst level. From untabulated results, the 
estimated coefficients on Forecast Optimism range from -3.147% (t-stat: -2.08) to -4.335% (t-stat: -2.44), 
whereas the estimated coefficients on Forecast Accuracy range from -5.458% (t-stat: -3.83) to -7.006% (t-
stat: -3.06). 
 70
regression specifications. The absolute magnitude of Recession is approximately ranked 
as the third (fifth) most important determinant in explaining the variation in Forecast 
Optimism (Forecast Accuracy) in column 5 when different known variables are 
controlled for.74,75 
Table 5.4 reports the results of different robustness checks. The above results 
survive an extensive list of robustness checks.  
After 1993 excludes forecasts made before the year 1993. After Regulation FD 
uses sample data on or after year 2001, the year after the Regulation Fair Disclosure was 
enacted. Left Censored at 1984 excludes those analysts who first appear in the IBES 
before 1984. At Least 3 Years of Experience includes those analysts who have at least 
three years of experience. Controlling for Industry-Year FEs controls for year-industry 
fixed effects (instead of year and industry fixed effects) in baseline regressions. Price-
Scaled Dependent Variables replace the dependent variables with (absolute) forecast 
error variables relative to actual earnings, scaled by lag price in the prior month. Non-
Linear Control Variables replace Firm-Specific Experience, General Experience, 
Number of Companies/Industries, Brokerage Size, Days to Year-End, and Firm Coverage 
with the natural logarithm of the corresponding variables of interest. FM Regressions 
report the regression results estimated using annual time-series cross-sectional Fama-
MacBeth (1973) regressions. NBER recession uses an alternative definition and replaces 
                                                 
74 Brokerage house size has a strong influence on Forecast Optimism and Forecast Accuracy. In 
untabulated results where I re-estimate specification (5) in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 without brokerage house 
fixed effects, the estimated coefficients on brokerage house size are -2.160 (t-stat:-4.19) and 4.699 (t-
stat:10.25), respectively. The corresponding estimated coefficients on Recession are -3.216 (t-stat:-2.69) 
and -4.737 (t-stat:-4.55), respectively. The explanatory power of brokerage house size is currently 
subsumed by brokerage house fixed effect in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
75 The statistical significance of Days to year-end would substantially decrease once the standard errors are 
clustered at the time dimension. In untabulated results, when I re-estimate specifications (5) in Tables 5.2 
and 5.3 with standard errors clustered at time level, the statistical significances for Days to year-end are 
4.84 and -21.01, respectively.  
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Recession with NBER recession, which takes one when analysts first appear in IBES 
during the NBER recessions. The results are much weaker under specifications (1) and 
(2) but are similar under specifications (3)-(5) where more control variables are included. 
The estimated coefficients on Recession after re-estimating those regression 
specifications in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 range from -1.618 (t-stat:-1.76) to -9.689 (t-stat:-
4.83). 
Overall, the above evidence suggests that recession analysts are more pessimistic 
and less accurate than their peers.  
 
5.3.4 Diffusion of Experience  
Table 5.5 examines whether analyst pessimism and accuracy would diffuse as 
analysts accumulate more experience in the industry profession. 
Panel A re-estimates the baseline regressions by including an interaction between 
Young Analyst, which takes one during the first three years of an analyst’s career, and 
Recession. First, young analysts appear to be more pessimistic during their early careers, 
as the estimated coefficients on Young Analyst are all negative, ranging from -0.590 (t-
stat:-0.54) to -4.302 (t-stat:-3.64). The pessimism of recession analysts persists over time, 
as the estimated coefficients on the interaction of Recession and Young Analyst are all 
positive but not statistically significant across different specifications from columns (1) to 
(5). For Forecast Accuracy, recession analysts are less accurate during their early careers 
(than their later careers), as the estimated coefficients on the interaction of Recession and 
Young Analyst are all statistically significant and negative, ranging from -4.755 (t-stat:-
2.40) to -6.979 (t-stat:-3.16). In other words, recession analysts are more inaccurate (than 
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non-recession peers) during their whole careers, and they are more inaccurate in their 
early careers (than in their later careers). 
Panel B includes an interaction of Recession and General experience to capture 
the diffusion of experience on analysts’ forecast optimism and accuracy. The estimated 
coefficients on the interaction term do not show any systematic difference on analyst 
optimism, as the negative coefficients are not statistically significant across different 
specifications. For Forecast Accuracy, recession analysts tend to improve their accuracy 
when they have longer professional experience. As various variables (except dummy) 
have been standardized, the results in Panel B suggest that the inaccurate performance of 
recession analysts tends to dissipate after recession analysts spend 2-3 years in the 
profession. Similar to Panel A, these results suggest that (1) recession analysts tend to 
perform worse in their early careers (than in their later careers), but (2) this discrepancy 
tends to decrease a few years down the road. On the other hand, how many years 
recession analysts spend in the profession has no influence on their pessimism, 
suggesting again that the pessimism of recession analysts tends to persist over time. 
 
5.3.5 Boom and Recession Analysts 
I further examine whether analysts who first become lead analysts in boom times 
are more optimistic than their non-boom peers. More specifically, I define Boom as a 
dummy that takes one when an analyst first appears in IBES during the years when the 
non-negative annual employment growth in the analyst labor market is in its top tertile, or 
zero otherwise.  
Table 5.6 summarizes the results by including Boom in baseline regressions. In 
Panel A, boom analysts are more optimistic than non-boom analysts, as all estimated 
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coefficients on Forecast Optimism are statistically significant and positive (from 3.098% 
(t-stat:2.81) to 3.194% (t-stat:2.90)) across different specifications in columns (1)-(5). In 
Panel B, I further include Recession and find that the optimism (pessimism) of boom 
(recession) analysts continues to survive (except for Boom in specification (2)). 
Recession analysts are more influenced by the initial labor market condition than boom 
analysts, as the absolute values of the estimated coefficients on Recession are larger than 
those on Boom. Panel C further reports the robustness checks of the above results. I re-
estimate the regressions following those robustness checks in Table 5.4. Except for 3 
Years and Price-Scaled Dependent Variable, where the estimated coefficients are not 
significant, all other estimated coefficients are significantly positive. The insignificance 
of these two tests suggests that (1) the optimism of boom analysts tends to be short-lived 
and dissipates after their early careers (i.e., after 3 years), and (2) boom analysts are only 
more optimistic relative to their peers (i.e., percentile-rank optimism metric), but the 
levels of their forecasts (i.e., price-scaled forecast error) are not necessarily lower than 
non-recession cohorts. 
The results on Forecast Accuracy are reported in columns (6)-(10) in Panels A 
and B. For forecast accuracy in Panel A, boom analysts seem to be more accurate than 
recession analysts, as the estimated coefficients on Boom range from 3.456 (t-stat:3.54) to 
4.477 (t-stat:3.86). In Panel B, its strong economic and statistical significance remains 
even after Recession is included in the baseline regressions. However, these results are 
less robust, as the estimated coefficients in Panel D are weak and insignificant under a 
number of robustness tests: After 1993, After Regulation FD, Price-Scaled Dependent 
Variable, and Fama-MacBeth Regressions. Overall, boom analysts appear to be more 
optimistic than their non-boom peers, but it seems that there is only very weak evidence 
suggesting their superior accuracy. 
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On the contrary, the estimated coefficients on Recession remain robust, as they 
continue to be strongly negative across different specifications even after Boom is 
included. More specifically, recession analysts are shown to be more pessimistic than 
their peers in Panels B, C and D, as the test that gives the lowest statistical significance 
on Recession is the one on 3 Years (i.e., excluding young analysts with less than three 
years of experience), where -1.68 (estimated coefficient:-3.074) is reported. 
 
5.3.6 All-Star Analysts 
To examine the influence of their job performance on attaining all-star analyst 
status, I run the logistic regressions regressing Ever Star, which takes one after an analyst 
is ranked as an all-star analyst in Institutional Investor magazine, on a wide host of 
known determinants.  
Table 5.7 reports the estimated marginal probabilities of these pooled logistic 
regressions. In Panel A, recession analysts are less likely to become all-star analysts by 
1.5% (t-stat:1.70) to 2.4% (t-stat:2.23). The lower probability of becoming all-star 
analysts is not surprising, as recession analysts have lower forecast accuracy (notably 
during their early careers). I re-estimate these logistic regressions on boom analysts in 
Panels B and C, but do not find any systematic difference in their probabilities of 
becoming all-star analysts. This confirms the earlier findings in Panel D of Table 5.6, 
where boom analysts are shown as not necessarily more accurate. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the cyclical labor market has a long-lasting 
impact on first-time managers’ style and performance. Using the analyst profession as a 
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setting, I find that analysts who start their analyst careers in recessions (i.e., recession 
analysts) are more pessimistic, less accurate, and less likely to become all-star analysts 
than their non-recession cohorts. These results are robust after controlling for a wide host 
of known variables that influence analysts’ style and skills. On the contrary, while boom 
analysts are shown to be more optimistic in their future careers, they do not necessarily 
have greater forecast accuracy. 
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION  
Using the sell-side analyst as a setting, this dissertation examines the following 
question: how do individuals’ past experiences affect their future economic behaviors? 
More specifically, these chapters comprehensively examine to what extent analysts’ 
styles and skills are influenced by their early mentorship and labor market experience 
when they first start their analyst jobs. 
Chapter 3 shows that early career mentors influence sell-side analysts’ optimism 
and skills. I defined early career mentors as those colleagues who work in the same 
brokerage house (i.e., same house), cover the same sector (i.e., same team), and have 
more years of professional experience (i.e., veteran) during analysts’ early careers as 
junior analysts. While analysts are more optimistic (pessimistic) in their future 
professional careers if they work with optimistic (pessimistic) mentors in their early 
careers, I find that there is no spillover in accuracy. Only talented superstar mentors (i.e., 
all-star analysts) can break this pattern, spilling their forecasting skills to their protégés.  
Chapter 4 indicates that market participants are able to take the mentor-mentee 
relationship as a personal characteristic into account when digesting analysts’ forecast 
revisions. More specifically, the market generally responds more weakly to the revisions 
made by analysts who have optimistic mentors. Sophisticated institution investors 
substantially discount the revisions made by the protégés of optimistic mentors, 
regardless of the direction of revisions.  
In this chapter, I also implement a wide set of falsification tests and econometric 
exercises showing that the results on optimism spillover are not driven by analysts’ self-
selection into optimistic brokerage houses or mentor relationships. 
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Chapter 5 exploits another novel setting and finds the styles and skills of first-
time analysts depend on cyclical shocks in the labor market. Using the cyclical labor 
market as a form of exogenous shock, I exploit a novel setting to examine if sell-side 
analysts differ in their style and skills depending on their early career macroeconomic 
environment. This paper shows that analysts who start their careers in a tough labor 
market are more pessimistic, less accurate, and less likely to become all-star analysts than 
their non-recession peers. While their forecast accuracy improves as they gain more 
experience, they continue to hold onto their pessimism. On the contrary, while boom 
analysts are more optimistic, they are not necessarily more accurate. Moreover, their 
optimism is shown to be short-lived. Collectively, the above evidence suggests that the 
development of firm-specific human capital is endogenous to time-varying 
macroeconomic conditions. The asymmetric performance of boom and recession analysts 









Figure 2.1: BP’s Stock Price Movements 
























































































Figure 2.2: Historical Levels of Mentor Optimism 
All bars above represent different measures of historical optimism of analysts’ mentors during 
analysts’ early careers. “Recommendations” refers to the average proportion of “Strong Buy” 
recommendations initiated, reiterated, or upgraded in a mentor’s portfolio during a given year, 
averaged across all analyst-mentors pairs. “Earnings Forecasts” refers to the average percentile-
rank optimism (Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000; Hong and Kubik, 2003) in one-year-ahead 
earnings per share forecasts of all mentors during an analyst’s early career, averaged across all 
analyst-mentors pairs. Early career is defined as either an analyst’s first job or the first three years 
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Figure 3.1: Analyst Optimism on Historical Mentor Optimism 
These bar charts plot the averages of Analyst Optimism (y-axis) on Mentor Optimism (x-axis). All 
Mentor Optimism is measured historically based on the optimism of analysts’ mentors in the 
analysts’ first jobs. Distributions are created for each figure as follows: Analyst Optimism is first 
assigned a percentile rank score from 0 (least optimistic) to 100 (most optimistic) each year. Each 
historical Mentor Optimism is also sorted into deciles from the least optimistic mentors (bin 1) to 
the most optimistic mentors (bin 10). For each Mentor Optimism decile, Analyst Optimism is then 



































Figure 3.2: Timelines of Mentor Optimism: An Example 
The above timelines illustrate the timing of Mentor Optimism and Analyst Optimism. Analysts’ 
employment history is highlighted in color (blue for mentor; orange for analyst). Assuming that 
an analyst spends his or her first three years (from years t to t+2) in a brokerage house with his or 
her mentors, Mentor Optimism is measured based on the optimism of the mentors in the analyst’s 
first brokerage house during years t to t+2 (bolded box). For Analyst Optimism (bolded box), it is 
only measured after the first job from years t+3 and beyond. Note that these optimism metrics are 
measured sequentially but not simultaneously. 
  







Panel A: Strong Buys Panel B: Upgrade Jumps 
Panel C: Earnings Forecast Optimism Panel D: Price Growth Optimism 
  
Figure 3.3: Distributions of Estimated Coefficients on Pseudo-Mentor Optimism 
The figure plots the distributions of estimated coefficients on Pseudo-Mentor Optimism. The 
steps of pseudo-mentor randomization are as follows. First, analysts are matched with mentors 
randomly drawn from the sample without replacement. The final deliverable is a simulated panel 
on employment history in which analysts are matched with Pseudo-Mentors. Second, after 
assembling this pseudo-mentor panel, regressions are run with the optimism metrics of the 
pseudo-mentors (i.e., Pseudo-Mentor Optimism) with the control variables and fixed effects 
identical to Columns (4) and (8) in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. This two-step randomization 
is repeated 1,000 times. To improve readability, the estimated coefficients ranged from -3 to +3 































































Figure 3.4: 2008 Location Snapshot of Brokerage Houses and Their Branches 
This figure is a snapshot of brokerage house location (including all headquarters and branches) at 
the end of 2008. The number in each circle is the total number of brokerage houses. This snapshot 
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Figure 3.5: Location Proximity Tests 
The figure above reports the estimated coefficients on Mentor Optimism. The regression 
specifications are identical to those in Columns (4) and (8) in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Results in left 
(right) panel are based on analysts who have more than 25 (50) analysts in their first brokerage 
houses. t-statistics (Number of observations) are reported in parentheses (brackets). All estimates 
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Panel A: Subsamples based on Brokerage Sizes 
 
Panel B: Subsamples based on Large and Small Brokerage Houses 
 
Figure 4.1: Subsamples based on Size of First Brokerage Houses 
The above charts plot the estimated coefficients on Mentor Optimism based on the size of 



































































Panel A provides the summary statistics for the main variables in the sample. Panel B reports the 
pairwise Pearson correlations. Panel C reports the distribution of analyst-mentor pairs in the main 
sample. Earnings forecasts, recommendations, and price targets are all obtained from IBES. 
Mentors are those colleagues who work in the same brokerage house (i.e., same house), cover the 
same IBES sector (i.e., same team), and have more years of professional experience (i.e., veteran) 
during analysts’ early careers as protégés. Early Career is defined as the analyst’s first job or the 
first three years of the analyst’s first job as junior analyst, whichever is shorter, provided that the 
analyst remains at the firm for at least six months; this definition ensures that the analyst has 
spent a reasonable amount of time in his or her first job. Mentors are also required to enter into 
the profession, as measured by their first appearances in IBES, at least one year earlier than their 
protégés. To avoid extreme values in optimism metrics, an analyst is required to have at least 
three years of experience and cover at least three firms in a given year. All variable definitions are 
summarized in Appendix 2. In Panel B, superscripts of A, B, and C represent significance levels 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is from 1983 to 2010. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Main variables  Mean Stdev Min P25 P50 P75 Max Obs 
Strong buy         
- Protégés  0.24 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.41 1.00 14,492 
- Mentors 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.11 0.25 0.39 1.00 11,180 
Upgrade Jumps         
- Protégés 0.13 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 1.00 13,856 
- Mentors 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.16 1.00 10,630 
Earnings forecast optimism         
- Protégés 50.57 27.73 1 27 51 74 100 17,454 
- Mentors 51.12 18.74 1.00 40.00 50.40 62.25 100.00 17,454 
Price growth optimism         
- Protégés  51.47 27.51 1 28 51 75 100 9,568 
- Mentors 51.37 19.23 1.00 37.75 51.18 65.00 100.00 6,311 
Other variables         
Accuracy 51.93 27.82 1 29 53 76 100 17,454 
All-star analyst 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 0 1 17,454 
All-star mentors 0.53 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 17,454 
Brokerage size 54.83 43.92 1 20 43 76 203 17,454 
Days to year-end         
- Earnings forecasts 118.32 61.70 30.00 74.78 97.67 142.42 361.00 17,454 
- Price targets 192.78 49.90 0.00 168.25 189.48 212.17 365.00 10,008 
- Recommendations 190.27 56.00 3.00 157.64 188.63 220.00 364.00 14,486 
Firm coverage 14.82 6.42 1.00 10.22 14.06 18.47 56.00 17,454 
Firm-specific experience 4.19 2.21 1.00 2.71 3.69 5.00 26.33 17,454 
General experience 8.02 4.03 3 5 7 10 28 17,454 
Prop. of all-star mentors 0.16 0.29 0 0 0 0.25 1 26,473 
Number of companies 12.71 7.99 1 8 12 16 112 17,454 
Number of industries 5.34 3.72 1 3 4 7 36 17,454 
Underwriting 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 1.00 17,454 
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Table 3.1  
Summary Statistics – Continued 
Panel B: Correlations of Optimism Metrics 
  Protégés Mentors 






Strong buys  (StrongB) 1.000       
Upgrade jumps  (UJump) 0.557A 1.000      
Earn. forecast opt.  (FOpt) -0.001 0.005 1.000     





 Strong buys  (StrongB) 0.208
A 0.153A 0.013 0.097A 1.000   
Upgrade jumps  (UJump) 0.182A 0.185A -0.010 0.033A 0.469A 1.000  
Earn. forecast opt.  (FOpt) 0.012 -0.001 0.060A 0.023B 0.018C 0.027A 1.000 
Price growth opt. (PGOpt) 0.058A 0.018 -0.010 0.220A 0.136A -0.021C -0.021C 
Panel C: Distribution of Analysts and Mentors 
Year Number of Analysts 
Fraction of 
Analysts (%) 
Median Number  
of Mentors 
Mean Number  
of Mentors 
1985 101  6.78 3 3.73 
1986 216  14.15 3 3.92 
1987 272  17.87 2 3.00 
1988 330  22.24 2 3.19 
1989 416  26.02 3 3.32 
1990 389  24.30 2 3.09 
1991 468  31.56 3 3.90 
1992 687  46.08 3 4.15 
1993 698  41.55 3 4.63 
1994 666  36.20 3 4.73 
1995 705  35.80 3 6.51 
1996 818  38.12 4 6.91 
1997 922  38.79 4 7.81 
1998 1,015  39.76 4 8.62 
1999 1,156  43.46 5 9.61 
2000 1,203  45.43 5 8.86 
2001 1,189  47.66 6 9.67 
2002 1,133  45.78 6 9.64 
2003 1,082  43.70 6 9.89 
2004 1,200  45.96 5 8.94 
2005 1,299  48.71 4 8.06 
2006 1,424  52.30 4 7.20 
2007 1,441  52.88 4 7.12 
2008 1,416  54.03 4 7.39 
2009 1,350  54.26 3 5.62 
2010 596  68.11 3 5.11 
Average 853.54 39.29 3.73 6.33 
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Table 3.2 
Spillover of Recommendation Optimism 
This table reports the pooled panel regression results for recommendation optimism. The 
dependent variables are Strong Buys (Columns 1-4) and Upgrade Jumps (Columns 5-8), 
respectively. Strong Buys is defined as the number of strong buy recommendations initiated, 
upgraded, or reinitiated divided by the total number of outstanding recommendations made by an 
analyst in a given year. Upgrade Jumps is defined as the number of large upgrades to the total 
number of recommendation revisions made by an analyst in a given year. A revision is regarded 
as large if the revision in recommendation rating for a given firm is not to its immediately 
adjacent rating category. For instance, an upgrade is a jump when the rating is upgraded from 
“Sell” to “Buy.” The main explanatory variables, Mentor Strong Buys and Mentor Upgrade 
Jumps, are constructed in the same manner. All-Star Analyst is a dummy indicating whether an 
analyst is ranked as all-star analyst in the previous year’s October issue of the Institutional 
Investor magazine. Number of Companies and Number of Industries respectively refer to the 
number of companies and IBES industries followed by an analyst in the previous twelve months. 
General Experience is the number of years after an analyst first appears in IBES. Firm-Specific 
Experience is the number of years an analyst covers the firm. Brokerage Size is the number of 
analysts employed by a brokerage house in the previous twelve months. Underwriting is the 
proportion of firms affiliated with an analyst’s brokerage firm. Days to Year-End refers to the 
average number of days of recommendations to the forthcoming fiscal year-end. Firm Coverage 
is the average coverage of an analyst’s portfolio of firms. Accuracy is the percentile-rank 
accuracy following Hong and Kubik (2003). Additional details on all variables are summarized in 
Appendix 2. First Brokerage House Fixed Effects is first brokerage house fixed effects, which 
assign a value of one to each house that analysts and mentors both belonged to during their early 
careers. Industry Fixed Effects is the industry fixed effects based on IBES sectors. Time Fixed 
Effects is the year fixed effects. Each observation is at analyst-year level. The sample period is 
from 1983 to 2010. For ease of interpretation, all variables except dummy have been standardized 
with zero mean and unit standard deviation. All estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 
100 to improve readability. Standard errors are clustered at analyst level and t-statistics are 






Spillover of Recommendation Optimism – Continued 
 Dependent Variables: 
 Strong Buys Upgrade Jumps 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mentor strong buys 6.276 4.741 4.437 4.341     
 (3.47) (2.58) (2.48) (2.36)     
Mentor upgrade jumps     5.935 6.678 6.695 6.983 
     (3.12) (3.50) (3.58) (3.54) 
All-star analyst  -12.066 -2.743 -0.644  -7.289 -1.566 -0.199 
  (-3.34) (-0.78) (-0.18)  (-1.59) (-0.34) (-0.04) 
Firm-specific experience  -3.861 -3.219 -2.626  0.684 0.811 -0.194 
  (-2.20) (-1.89) (-1.40)  (0.35) (0.41) (-0.09) 
General experience  1.728 0.599 -0.608  -0.886 -1.390 -1.015 
  (0.78) (0.28) (-0.26)  (-0.39) (-0.60) (-0.39) 
Number of companies  -3.339 -1.982 -2.331  2.433 3.613 2.763 
  (-2.40) (-1.46) (-1.60)  (1.60) (2.40) (1.68) 
Number of industries  0.550 -0.075 -1.003  -2.704 -3.088 -2.775 
  (0.36) (-0.05) (-0.64)  (-0.93) (-1.25) (-1.21) 
Brokerage size   -15.109 -14.622   -8.822 -9.728 
   (-9.30) (-8.30)   (-4.74) (-4.94) 
Underwriting   -0.970 -1.126   -4.825 -5.425 
   (-0.67) (-0.74)   (-3.57) (-3.88) 
Accuracy    0.794    2.026 
    (0.59)    (1.34) 
Days to year-end    -0.327    1.287 
    (-0.29)    (1.15) 
Firm coverage    -3.340    2.362 
    (-1.91)    (1.25) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First brokerage house FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 11,702 11,702 11,702 10,400 10,773 10,773 10,773 9,639 






Spillover of Earnings Forecast and Price Target Optimism 
This table reports the panel regression results for optimism in earnings forecasts and price targets. 
The dependent variables are respectively Earnings Forecast Optimism (Columns 1-4), defined as 
the percentile-rank optimism measure based on one-year-ahead earnings forecasts following 
Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) and Hong and Kubik (2003), and Price Growth Optimism 
(Columns 5-8), computed based on the one-year-ahead split-adjusted price target to the split-
adjusted stock price on announcement date. The main explanatory variables, Mentor Earnings 
Forecast Optimism and Mentor Price Growth Optimism, are constructed in the same manner. 
Additional details on all variables are summarized in Appendix 2. The sample period is from 
1983 to 2010. For ease of interpretation, all variables except dummy have been standardized with 
zero mean and unit standard deviation. All estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 100 to 
improve readability. Standard errors are clustered at analyst level and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
 Dependent Variables: 
 Earnings Forecast Optimism Price Growth Optimism 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mentor earnings 3.955 4.039 4.175 4.092     
forecast optimism (2.58) (2.68) (2.77) (2.76)     
Mentor price growth     11.890 7.998 7.982 9.043 
   optimism     (5.43) (3.55) (3.61) (4.07) 
All-star analyst  -4.294 -0.972 -2.732  -12.356 -7.974 -5.065 
  (-1.17) (-0.26) (-0.75)  (-2.04) (-1.31) (-0.83) 
Firm-specific experience  -1.156 -1.093 -2.875  -5.325 -4.582 -5.356 
  (-0.68) (-0.64) (-1.71)  (-2.50) (-2.18) (-2.35) 
General experience  14.535 14.240 13.314  1.503 0.694 1.135 
  (8.10) (7.85) (7.49)  (0.51) (0.24) (0.36) 
Number of companies  1.271 1.570 1.386  0.915 1.303 0.239 
  (0.88) (1.09) (0.93)  (0.38) (0.55) (0.09) 
Number of industries  -3.181 -3.354 -2.912  2.689 2.263 -0.016 
  (-2.06) (-2.20) (-1.86)  (1.14) (0.97) (-0.01) 
Brokerage size   -5.642 -6.454   -8.384 -7.643 
   (-3.67) (-4.26)   (-3.31) (-2.90) 
Underwriting   -1.833 -1.744   5.621 4.693 
   (-1.50) (-1.43)   (2.91) (2.33) 
Accuracy    15.095    0.789 
    (10.05)    (0.46) 
Days to year-end    8.475    -0.848 
    (7.88)    (-0.53) 
Firm coverage    1.090    -12.014 
    (0.68)    (-5.23) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First brokerage house FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 15,981 15,981 15,981 15,981 6,401 6,401 6,401 5,566 




Impact of Optimistic vs. Pessimistic Mentors 
This table reports the pooled logistic regression results. In Panel A, the dependent variables are 
Strong Buy Dummy, Upgrade Jump Dummy, Optimistic Forecast Dummy, and Optimistic Price 
Growth Dummy, respectively. Each dummy takes one when an analyst’s corresponding optimism 
metric in the top quintile in a given year. Optimistic Mentors is an indicator that takes one when a 
specific mentor metric is the top 10% or 20% in a given year. In Panel B, the dependent variables 
are Fewer Strong Buy Dummy, Fewer Upgrade Jump Dummy, Pessimistic Forecast Dummy, and 
Pessimistic Price Growth Dummy, respectively. Each dummy takes one when an analyst’s 
corresponding optimism metric is in the bottom quintile in a given year. Optimistic Mentors is 
similarly defined as an indicator that takes one when a specific mentor metric is in the bottom 
10% or 20% in a given year. All variables are defined in the same manner as in Table 3.2 and 3.3 
with additional details summarized in Appendix 2. The sample period is from 1983 to 2010. All 
marginal probabilities have been multiplied by 100 to improve readability. Standard errors are 
clustered at analyst level and z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Baseline Regressions 












Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Optimistic mentors 12.823 8.097 16.871 6.579 4.841 4.303 13.470 5.283 
 - Top 10% indicators  (8.75) (6.73) (9.69) (7.84) (3.25) (3.09) (5.66) (2.93) 
         
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Accuracy effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Brokerage house effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Days to year-end effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-specific exp. effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm coverage effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
General experience effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Num of companies effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Num of industries effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Underwriting effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 11,702 10,362 11,612 10,272 15,981 15,955 5,588 4,967 
Pseudo-R2 (%) 1.163 11.132 1.690 18.159 0.179 5.722 1.418 11.374 
         
Alternative definition         
Optimistic mentors 11.407 7.731 15.229 6.131 2.796 2.021 9.228 3.084 




Table 3.4  
Impact of Optimistic vs. Pessimistic Mentors – Continued  
Panel B: Impact of Pessimistic Mentors 












Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pessimistic mentors 1.285 1.747 8.899 4.291 4.540 3.415 10.557 5.130 
 - Bottom 10% indicators  (0.68) (0.88) (9.24) (7.38) (2.83) (2.25) (4.43) (2.23) 
Constant/Controls/FE Identical to Panel A 
Number of observations 11,702 10,390 11,612 9,934 15,981 15,930 5,588 5,020 
Pseudo-R2 (%) 0.007 17.484 1.357 9.983 0.137 5.056 0.837 10.304 
         
Alternative definition         
Pessimistic mentors 8.879 8.918 6.700 2.982 4.033 3.562 9.975 4.415 
 - Top 20% indicators  (6.39) (6.13) (8.43) (6.44) (3.31) (3.11) (5.39) (2.38) 












Top 10% indicators          
 - Optimistic mentors  12.780 8.023 15.754 6.525 4.649 3.985 12.926 4.957 
 (8.66) (6.60) (9.00) (7.78) (3.10) (2.84) (5.41) (2.74) 
 - Pessimistic mentors  -0.450 -0.843 -9.104 -0.650 -1.861 -2.715 -4.946 -3.186 
 (-0.24) (-0.51) (-3.76) (-0.58) (-1.18) (-1.82) (-1.77) (-1.49) 
Constant/Controls/FE Identical to Panel A 
Number of observations 11,702 10,362 11,612 10,272 15,981 15,955 5,588 4,967 








Panels A and B report the pooled panel regression results for analyst accuracy. The dependent 
variable is percentile-rank accuracy following Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) and Hong and 
Kubik (2003). In Panel B, All-Star Mentor is a dummy indicating whether at least one of the 
analyst’s mentors has ever been ranked as an all-star analyst in the Institutional Investor 
magazine since 1983. Panel C reports the marginal probabilities from regressing all-star analyst 
dummy on a host of explanatory variables and Proportion of All-Star Mentors, which is defined 
as the proportion of all-star mentors ever ranked as all-star analysts in prior Institutional Investor 
magazines. The sample period is from 1983 to 2010. All marginal probabilities have been 
multiplied by 100 to improve readability. Standard errors are clustered at analyst level and z-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Baseline Regressions  
 Dependent Variable: 
 Accuracy 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mentor accuracy 1.300 1.071 0.971 0.328 
 (0.89) (0.78) (0.70) (0.26) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Identical to Columns (1)-(4) in Table 3.2 
First brokerage house FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Num of observations 15,981 15,981 15,981 15,981 
Adjusted-R2 (%) 7.355 11.068 11.179 22.246 
Panel B: All-Star Mentors 
All-star mentors × 3.657 2.940 7.492 4.264 
   Mentor accuracy (1.87) (1.67) (2.67) (1.71) 
All-star mentors   3.547 3.736 
   (0.96) (1.11) 
Mentor accuracy 0.235 -0.520 -1.696 -1.405 
 (0.15) (-0.38) (-0.95) (-0.88) 
Constant/Control/FEs Identical to 
Column (1) in 
Panel A 
Identical to 
Column (4) in 
Panel A 
Identical to 
Column (1) in 
Panel A 
Identical to 
Column (4) in 
Panel A 
Num of observations 15,981 15,981 15,981 15,981 





Skills Spillover – Continued  
Panel C: Impact of Having All-Star Mentors in Early Careers 
 Dependent Variable: All-Star Analyst Dummy 
 All Years All Years 1983-2000 2001-2010 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Prop. of all-star mentors 5.933 5.743 7.763 4.296 
 (7.50) (7.30) (5.83) (5.42) 
Analyst accuracy 0.153 0.136 0.257 0.054 
 (7.20) (6.29) (6.05) (3.18) 
Analyst optimism -0.013 -0.010 -0.003 0.003 
 (-0.67) (-0.49) (-0.08) (0.17) 
Brokerage size 8.942 8.702 12.645 5.242 
 (23.85) (23.17) (19.53) (12.87) 
General experience 0.263 -0.142 1.749 -0.659 
 (0.44) (-0.24) (1.43) (-1.29) 
Firm-specific experience 7.866 7.708 11.242 4.425 
 (11.19) (10.79) (9.32) (5.97) 
Number of companies  2.251 4.051 0.971 
  (5.58) (5.49) (2.75) 
Number of industries  -0.188 -1.306 0.522 
  (-0.57) (-2.18) (1.82) 
     
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 26,473  26,473   13,976   12,497  
Pseudo-R2 (%) 32.429 32.942 30.905 35.231 






This table reports the results of different robustness checks. Active analysts focuses on active 
analysts who cover at least eight firms per year. After 1993 excludes forecasts made before the 
year 1993. As stock recommendation and price target data are not available until 1993 and 1999, 
respectively, the estimates reported below under Columns (1) and (2) in the row After 1993 are 
identical to those reported in prior tables; however, they are re-iterated for illustration purposes. 
After Regulation FD uses sample data on or after year 2001, the year after the Regulation Fair 
Disclosure was enacted. Current Brokerage House Fixed Effects assigns a value of one to each 
house where an analyst is currently employed. Year of First Entry Fixed Effects, which is a series 
of dummies each taking a value of one for the year when analysts first appear in the IBES dataset, 
controls for analysts’ year of entry. Year-Sector Fixed Effects includes year-sector fixed effects in 
regressions. Standard errors are clustered at analyst level and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Fama-MacBeth (FM) Regressions report the regression results estimated using 
annual time-series cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. Except for year and first 
brokerage house fixed effects, which are not included, the regressions for the annual FM 
regressions are identical to those in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Positive (Negative) refers to the number 
of positive (negative) estimates. Significant refers to the significance at the 5% level. Standard 
errors are adjusted using Newey-West (1987) with a 4-year lag and reported in brackets. All 
variables except dummy have been standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation. All 






Robustness Checks – Continued  
 Dependent Variables: 








Descriptions (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Active analysts 4.059 5.296 3.628 10.235 
 (2.12) (2.49) (2.28) (4.04) 
After 1993 4.341 6.983 4.339 9.043 
 (2.36) (3.54) (2.88) (4.07) 
After Regulation FD 4.531 7.812 3.508 9.298 
 (2.13) (3.00) (1.92) (4.05) 
Current brokerage house FEs 2.535 4.046 4.341 9.663 
      (2.56) (3.62) (3.23) (4.46) 
Year of entry fixed effects 5.339 7.204 3.789 8.973 
 (2.78) (3.68) (2.58) (4.07) 
Year-sector fixed effects 3.998 6.871 4.382 8.616 
 (2.14) (3.51) (2.94) (3.61) 
Fama-MacBeth regressions 14.766 13.962 5.853 10.007 
 [5.84] [3.31] [3.96] [4.88] 
#Positive 17 16 24 11 
#Positive+significant 14 14 6 8 
     
#Negative 0 1 2 0 
#Negative+significant  0 0 0 0 
Constant/Control/FEs Identical to 
Column (4) in 
Table 3.2 
Identical to 
Column (8) in 
Table 3.2 
Identical to 
Column (4) in 
Table 3.3 
Identical to 






Small Brokerage Houses: A Hybrid Estimation 
This table reports the pooled panel regression results based on hybrid mentor optimism metrics. 
For those small brokerage houses where analysts do not have mentors who cover the same sectors 
in their early careers, their missing mentor optimism metrics are replaced with the optimism 
metrics generated based on all other seniors regardless of whether they cover the same sectors. 
Panel A reports the baseline results estimated under this hybrid estimation for brokerage houses 
with fewer than five employees. Panel B uses alternative classifications to define “small 
brokerage house.” In Panel B, the number in brackets refers to the number of observations. The 
sample period is from 1983 to 2010. For ease of interpretation, all variables except dummy have 
been standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation. All estimated coefficients have 
been multiplied by 100 to improve readability. Standard errors are clustered at analyst level and t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Baseline Regressions 
 Dependent Variables: 






Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hybrid mentor optimism 4.725 6.902 3.310 9.192 
 (2.56) (3.54) (2.29) (4.10) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First brokerage house FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Identical to 
Column (4) in 
Table 3.2 
Identical to 
Column (8) in 
Table 3.2 
Identical to 
Column (4) in 
Table 3.3 
Identical to 
Column (8) in 
Table 3.3 
Number of observations 10,705 9,908 16,863 5,729 
Adjusted-R2 (%) 21.777 20.066 8.554 19.609 
Panel B: Alternative Classifications of Small Brokerage Houses 
Num of analysts in the first brokerage house   
- Fewer than 10 analysts 4.482 6.524 2.803 7.885 
 (2.40) (3.35) (1.99) (3.56) 
  [Obs=11,136] [10,277] [17,706] [5,984] 
- Fewer than 15 analysts 4.914 6.348 2.522 7.359 
 (2.68) (3.31) (1.84) (3.37) 
  [Obs=11,447] [10,567] [18,677] [6,191] 
- Fewer than 20 analysts 5.229 6.532 2.138 7.247 
 (2.87) (3.41) (1.59) (3.32) 
 [Obs=11,678] [10,782] [19,275] [6,369] 




Smart Market: Market Reaction Tests 
This table reports the pooled panel regression results for market reaction. The dependent variable 
refers to the size-adjusted cumulative return to the revision made by analyst i for firm j at time t 
in the windows of [-1,+1], [-1,+3], [-1,+5], or [-1,+10] around the revision date. Day 0 refers to 
the forecast revision date (or the preceding trading day if Day 0 is a non-trading day). [-j,+k] 
refers to the period from trading day j days before the forecast revision date to k days after the 
revision date. Size-adjusted cumulative returns are defined as the buy-and-hold return of firm j 
minus the buy-and-hold return for an equal-weighted portfolio of firms in the same NYSE size 
decile formed at the beginning of each year. In Panel A, Optimistic Mentor Dummy, defined as a 
dummy that takes one when Mentor Earnings Forecast Optimism is in the top decile and zero 
otherwise, is interacted with Revision Signal, which takes the value of +1 (-1) when an analyst’s 
revised forecast is above (below) both his or her own prior forecast estimate and the prior 
consensus, and zero otherwise (Gleason and Lee (2003)). Revision Magnitude is defined as the 
difference between an analyst’s current and previous earnings forecast for the same firm in the 
same fiscal-year, divided by the share price two days prior to the announcements of the revision. 
In Panel B, Pessimistic Mentor Dummy is defined in a similar fashion. Additional details on all 
variables are summarized in Appendix 2. To conserve space, the estimates of various control 
variables are reported in Online Appendix 2 In Panel C, all observations are sorted into terciles 
(i.e., high, mid, and low) based on the level of institutional ownership reported in the prior 
quarter’s Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f) database. The sample period is from 1983 
to 2009. For ease of interpretation, all variables except dummy have been standardized with zero 
mean and unit standard deviation. All estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 100 to 





Smart Market: Market Reaction Tests – Continued  
Panel A: Baseline Regressions  
 Dependent Variable: Size-Adjusted Cumulative Return 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Optimistic mentor dummy  -0.489 -0.478 -0.463 -0.446 -0.460 -0.442 -0.287 -0.258 
× Revision signal (-4.10) (-4.00) (-3.83) (-3.61) (-3.47) (-3.21) (-2.10) (-1.86) 
         
Optimistic mentor dummy 0.099 -0.178 0.493 0.228 0.292 0.009 0.378 0.124 
 (0.22) (-0.39) (0.96) (0.44) (0.56) (0.02) (0.71) (0.23) 
Revision signal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Revision magnitude Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Affiliated dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
All-star analyst No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Book-to-market ratio No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Brokerage size No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Days since last forecast No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Days to year-end No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Forecast frequency No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm size No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-specific experience No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
General experience No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 





Smart Market: Market Reaction Tests – Continued 
Panel A: Baseline Regressions – Continued  
 Dependent Variable: Size-Adjusted Cumulative Return 
 [-1,+1] [-1,+3] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel B: Optimistic and Pessimistic Mentors 
Optimistic mentor dummy  -0.491 -0.259 -0.465 -0.258 -0.460 -0.293 -0.286 -0.048
× Revision signal (-4.10) (-1.98) (-3.84) (-2.09) (-3.46) (-1.99) (-2.09) (-0.34) 
         
Pessimistic mentor 
dummy  -0.029 -0.038 -0.049 -0.067 -0.013 -0.032 0.010 -0.011
× Revision signal (-0.28) (-0.37) (-0.43) (-0.58) (-0.11) (-0.27) (0.08) (-0.09) 
         
         
Alternative definition         
Top 20% optimistic mentor  -0.370 -0.318 -0.323 -0.262 -0.300 -0.237 -0.269 -0.192
× Revision signal (-3.01) (-2.63) (-2.68) (-2.21) (-2.25) (-1.78) (-2.03) (-1.47) 
         
Top 20% pessimistic mentor -0.127 -0.167 -0.190 -0.234 -0.124 -0.167 -0.083 -0.129
× Revision signal (-0.97) (-1.27) (-1.45) (-1.79) (-0.97) (-1.31) (-0.63) (-0.99) 
         
Constant/Control/FEs Identical to Panel A 
Panel C: Smart Institutional Investors 
 
Estimated Coefficients on Optimistic Mentor Dummy × Revision 
Signal 
Level of institutional 
ownership (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
- High inst. ownership -0.888 -0.874 -0.858 -0.840 -0.769 -0.748 -0.589 -0.566
 (-4.20) (-4.17) (-3.82) (-3.77) (-3.35) (-3.24) (-2.72) (-2.67) 
         
- Mid inst. ownership -0.279 -0.277 -0.191 -0.187 -0.232 -0.228 -0.153 -0.149
 (-1.61) (-1.59) (-1.07) (-1.04) (-1.20) (-1.17) (-0.80) (-0.78) 
  
- Low inst. ownership -0.158 -0.145 -0.208 -0.189 -0.261 -0.240 -0.033 -0.004
 (-0.76) (-0.70) (-0.97) (-0.89) (-1.19) (-1.11) (-0.14) (-0.02) 
  





Junior Optimism and Span of First Job 
This table reports the pooled panel regression results. The dependent variables, Strong Buys, 
Upgrade Jumps, Earnings Forecast Optimism, and Price Growth Optimism, are identical to those 
reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In Panel A, Juniors are those colleagues who work in the same 
brokerage house (i.e., same house), who cover the same sector (i.e., same team), but have fewer 
years of professional experience (i.e., rookies) during analysts’ early careers. The first subpanel 
of Panel A reports the baseline regression results where analysts who join the same house in the 
same year are counted as Juniors, whereas the second subpanel excludes analysts who join the 
same house in the same year. Panel B sorts analysts based on the span of their first jobs. For ease 
of interpretation, all variables except dummy have been standardized with zero mean and unit 
standard deviation. All estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 100 to improve readability. 








Junior Optimism and Span of First Job – Continued  
Panel A: Junior Optimism 
 Baseline Results 
Junior optimism 2.826 2.547 -1.471 0.036 
 (1.23) (1.03) (-0.71) (0.01) 
     
Mentor optimism 3.005 5.808 6.174 12.677 
 (1.14) (1.62) (2.09) (4.12) 
Constant/Control/FEs Identical to 
Column (4) in 
Table 3.2 
Identical to 
Column (8) in 
Table 3.2 
Identical to 
Column (4) in 
Table 3.3 
Identical to 
Column (8) in 
Table 3.3 
 Alternative Juniors Definition 
Junior optimism 2.992 4.260 -2.379 -2.055 
 (1.08) (1.52) (-0.88) (-0.65) 
     
Mentor optimism 5.804 6.742 1.800 14.122 
 (1.91) (1.44) (0.44) (3.72) 
Constant/Control/FEs Identical to 
Column (4) in 
Table 3.2 
Identical to 
Column (8) in 
Table 3.2 
Identical to 
Column (4) in 
Table 3.3 
Identical to 
Column (8) in 
Table 3.3 
Panel B: Span of First Job 
Two years or more 4.712 6.805 4.008 9.083 
 (1.85) (2.53) (2.09) (3.01) 
     
Less than one year 1.235 12.495 -3.587 6.776 






Panel A provides the summary statistics for the main variables in the sample. Panel B reports the 
pairwise Pearson correlations. The main samples are obtained from IBES, whereas price 
information is obtained from CRSP. Recession (Non-Recession) refers to recession (non-
recession) analysts. Analyst accuracy (optimism) is the percentile-rank accuracy (optimism) 
following Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) and Hong and Kubik (2003). Recession is an 
indicator that takes one when an analyst first appears in the IBES dataset as a lead analyst during 
the years when the annual employment growth in the analyst labor market is negative (i.e., during 
the years of 1988-91, 2002-03, or 2009-10), or zero otherwise. Boom as a dummy that takes one 
when an analyst first appears in IBES during the years when the non-negative annual employment 
growth in the analyst labor market is in its top tertile, or zero otherwise (i.e., during the years of 
1984, 1986-1987, 1993-1994, 1998, or 2000), or zero otherwise. To avoid extreme values in 
optimism and accuracy metrics, an analyst is required to have at least three forecasts in a given 
year. All variable definitions are summarized in Appendix 3. t-statistics are clustered at analyst 
level. 
Main variables  Recess. Non-Rec. Diff. t-stat Mean Std. P25 P50 P75 Num. 
Analyst optimism 48.806 49.497 -0.690 -3.64 49.343 11.135 43 49 56 56,906
Analyst accuracy 49.972 51.087 -1.115 -5.80 50.839 11.320 45 52 58 56,906
All-star analyst 0.091 0.100 -0.009 -1.17 0.098 0.298 0 0 0 56,906
Ever-star analyst 0.152 0.174 -0.022 -1.99 0.170 0.375 0 0 0 56,906
Brokerage size          
- All jobs 43.280 45.860 -2.580 -2.62 45.287 40.562 15 33 60 56,906 
- First jobs 44.025 39.061 4.963 3.94 40.164 47.699 9 24 55 56,906
Days to year-end 116.659 119.007 -2.347 -3.42 118.485 56.404 77 102 144 56,906 
Firm-specific exp. 3.161 3.111 0.051 0.93 3.122 2.237 2 3 4 56,906 
Firm coverage 14.483 15.396 -0.912 -5.55 15.193 7.262 10 14 19 56,906 
General experi. 5.507 5.681 -0.174 -1.63 5.642 4.737 2 4 8 56,906 
Num of companies 12.419 11.816 0.604 2.85 11.950 8.572 6 10 15 56,906 
Num of industries 5.675 5.528 0.148 1.29 5.561 4.139 3 5 7 56,906 
Underwriting 0.049 0.046 0.003 1.29 0.047 0.107 0 0 0 56,906 
Recession     0.222 0.416 0 0 0 56,906 






Recession Analysts and Forecast Optimism 
This table reports the pooled panel regression results for forecast optimism. Forecast Optimism is 
defined as the percentile-rank optimism measure based on one-year-ahead earnings forecasts 
following Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) and Hong and Kubik (2003). Recession is an 
indicator that takes one when an analyst first appears in the IBES dataset as a lead analyst during 
the years when the annual employment growth in the analyst labor market is negative. All-Star 
Analyst is a dummy indicating whether an analyst is ranked as all-star analyst in the previous 
year’s October issue of the Institutional Investor magazine. Brokerage Size is the number of 
analysts employed by a brokerage house in the previous twelve months. Days to Year-End refers 
to the average number of days of recommendations to the forthcoming fiscal year-end. Firm 
Coverage is the average coverage of an analyst’s portfolio of firms. Accuracy is the percentile-
rank accuracy following Hong and Kubik (2003). Firm-Specific Experience is the number of 
years an analyst covers the firm. General Experience is the number of years after an analyst first 
appears in IBES. Number of Companies and Number of Industries respectively refer to the 
number of companies and IBES industries followed by an analyst in the previous twelve months. 
Underwriting is the proportion of firms affiliated with an analyst’s brokerage firm. Additional 
details on all variables are summarized in Appendix 3. Brokerage House Fixed Effects assign a 
value of one to each brokerage house that an analyst belongs to. Industry Fixed Effects is the 
industry fixed effects based on IBES sectors. Time Fixed Effects is the year fixed effects. Each 
observation is at analyst-year level. The sample period is from 1983 to 2010. For ease of 
interpretation, all variables except dummy have been standardized with zero mean and unit 
standard deviation. All estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 100 to improve readability. 




Table 5.2 – Continued  
Recession Analysts and Forecast Optimism 
 Dependent Variables: Forecast Optimism 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Recession -4.335 -4.139 -3.147 -3.818 -3.940 
 (-3.64) (-3.51) (-2.61) (-3.16) (-3.27) 
      
All-star analyst  -4.046 -4.640 -2.741 -2.108 
  (-2.88) (-3.27) (-1.87) (-1.46) 
Firm-specific experience  -0.213 -0.208 0.096 -0.587 
  (-0.30) (-0.29) (0.14) (-0.81) 
General experience  8.154 9.371 9.681 9.707 
  (11.35) (12.38) (12.96) (12.97) 
Number of companies   -0.389 0.322 0.300 
   (-0.82) (0.70) (0.60) 
Number of industries   0.183 -1.152 -0.533 
   (0.36) (-2.45) (-1.01) 
Analyst accuracy    0.023 2.308 
    (0.03) (2.67) 
Brokerage size    0.278 0.385 
    (0.27) (0.37) 
Days to year-end     5.544 
     (12.46) 
Firm coverage     0.744 
     (1.12) 
Underwriting     -0.484 
     (-0.91) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs No Yes Yes No Yes 
Time FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Brokerage house FEs No No No Yes Yes 
Num of observations 56,906  56,906  56,906  56,906  56,906  






Recession Analysts and Forecast Accuracy 
This table reports the pooled OLS regression results. The dependent variable, Forecast Accuracy, 
is percentile-rank accuracy following Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) and Hong and Kubik 
(2003). The regression specifications are identical to those in Table 5.2. Each observation is at 
analyst-year level. The sample period is from 1983 to 2010. For ease of interpretation, all 
variables except dummy have been standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation. All 
estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 100 to improve readability. Standard errors are 
clustered at analyst level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 Dependent Variables: Forecast Accuracy 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Recession -7.006 -6.659 -5.458 -5.122 -4.176 
 (-5.80) (-5.88) (-4.72) (-4.61) (-4.04) 
      
All-star analyst  20.006 17.970 9.300 6.134 
  (15.51) (13.59) (6.97) (5.05) 
Firm-specific experience  3.224 2.408 2.121 4.678 
  (4.28) (3.19) (3.00) (6.90) 
General experience  5.380 6.501 4.791 4.772 
  (7.35) (8.50) (6.46) (6.84) 
Number of companies   4.232 5.011 1.924 
   (6.72) (8.77) (3.82) 
Number of industries   -2.953 0.038 -0.165 
   (-5.37) (0.08) (-0.34) 
Analyst optimism    0.022 1.983 
    (0.03) (2.67) 
Brokerage size    -1.753 -1.510 
    (-1.72) (-1.61) 
Days to year-end     -28.944 
     (-77.48) 
Firm coverage     0.353 
     (0.59) 
Underwriting     -0.608 
     (-1.22) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs No Yes Yes No Yes 
Time FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Brokerage house FEs No No No Yes Yes 
Num of observations 56,906  56,906  56,906  56,906  56,906  







This table reports the results of different robustness checks. After 1993 excludes forecasts made 
before the year 1993. After Regulation FD uses sample data on or after year 2001, the year after 
the Regulation Fair Disclosure was enacted. Left Censored at 1984 excludes those analysts who 
first appear in the IBES before 1984. At Least 3 Years of Experience includes those analysts who 
have at least three years of experience. Controlling for Industry-Year FEs controls for year-
industry fixed effects (instead of year and industry fixed effects) in regressions. Price-Scaled 
Dependent Variables replace the dependent variables with (absolute) forecast error variables 
relative to actual earnings, scaled by lag price in the prior month. Non-linear control variables 
replace Firm-specific/General Experience, Number of Companies/Industries, Brokerage Size, 
Days to Year-End, and Firm Coverage with the natural logarithm of the corresponding variables 
of interest. NBER recession replaces Recession with an indicator which takes one when analysts 
first appear during the NBER recessions. Standard errors are clustered at analyst level and t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. FM Regressions report the regression results estimated 
using annual time-series cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. Except for year and 
brokerage house fixed effects, which are not included, the regressions for the annual FM 
regressions are identical to those in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Positive (Negative) refers to the number 
of positive (negative) estimates. Significant refers to the significance at the 5% level. Standard 
errors are adjusted using Newey-West (1987) with a 4-year lag and reported in brackets. All 
variables except dummy have been standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation. All 
estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 100. The details of each specification are in 
Appendix 4. 
 Dependent Variables:  
 Forecast Optimism Forecast Accuracy 
 Estimated Coefficients on Recession 
Descriptions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
After 1993 -5.050 -5.444 -5.346 -4.961 -5.106 -4.363 -5.307 -5.640 -5.121 -4.117
 (-3.85) (-4.24) (-4.14) (-3.86) (-4.00) (-3.35) (-4.32) (-4.53) (-4.36) (-3.77)
           
After Reg FD -6.021 -4.503 -4.442 -4.323 -4.205 -6.540 -4.936 -4.752 -3.869 -3.883
 (-3.47) (-2.67) (-2.64) (-2.63) (-2.58) (-3.95) (-3.15) (-3.06) (-2.58) (-2.76)
         
Left censored -2.709 -3.477 -4.174 -4.712 -4.758 -5.382 -6.667 -6.395 -6.215 -5.503
  at 1984 (-2.27) (-2.92) (-3.40) (-3.83) (-3.88) (-4.42) (-5.80) (-5.39) (-5.49) (-5.23)
         
At least 3 years -8.325 -7.435 -6.568 -7.768 -4.768 -9.689 -8.221 -4.958 -4.423 -4.224
  of experience (-4.06) (-3.68) (-3.13) (-3.74) (-3.75) (-4.83) (-4.39) (-2.53) (-2.42) (-2.47)
         
Controlling for  -4.307 -3.012 -3.014 -3.715 3.751 -7.131 -5.450 -5.413 -5.008 -4.156
  industry-year FEs (-3.51) (-2.49) (-2.50) (-3.07) (-3.11) (-5.70) (-4.69) (-4.65) (-4.48) (-4.01)
         
Price-scaled -6.375 -6.747 -1.859 -2.114 -2.192 -7.266 -7.844 -1.954 -1.618 -2.228
  dependent var. (-7.79) (-8.32) (-2.50) (-2.75) (-2.90) (-7.38) (-8.40) (-2.24) (-1.76) (-2.59)
           
Non-linear -4.335 -4.391 -3.050 -3.609 -3.762 -7.006 -7.036 -5.717 -5.511 -4.335
  control var. (-3.64) (-3.72) (-2.53) (-2.98) (-3.12) (-5.80) (-6.23) (-4.95) (-4.98) (-4.22)
           
NBER recession 2.019 0.383 -2.725 -3.012 -2.652 2.038 -2.235 -4.553 -5.694 -6.395
   (1.53) (0.30) (-1.99) (-2.19) (-1.93) (1.48) (-1.75) (-3.42) (-4.37) (-5.28)
Controls/FEs Identical to the corresponding  
columns in Table 5.2 
Identical to the corresponding  
columns Table 5.3 
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Table 5.4 – Continued  
Robustness Checks 
 Dependent Variables:  
 Forecast Optimism Forecast Accuracy 
Descriptions Estimated Coefficients on Recession 
FM regressions -2.608 -4.037 -4.097 -4.194 -3.785 -4.916 -3.640 -3.342 -3.452 -3.450
 (-2.16) (-3.15) (-3.10) (-3.31) (-3.29) (-1.75) (-3.40) (-3.32) (-3.48) (-3.47)
           
#Negative 15 20 19 18 18 16 17 17 18 19 
#Negative+sig. 5 7 6 7 4 11 7 6 5 7 
           
#Positive 8 3 4 5 5 7 6 6 5 4 
#Positive+sig. 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 0 
           
Controls/FEs Identical to the corresponding  
columns in Table 5.2 
Identical to the corresponding  








Diffusion of Experience 
This table reports the panel regression results for boom and recession analysts. The dependent 
variables are Forecast Optimism (columns 1-5) and Forecast Accuracy (columns 6-10), 
respectively. The baseline regressions are identical to those in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. 
Young Analyst is a dummy that takes one during the first three years after an analyst appears in 
IBES. Additional details on all variables are summarized in Appendix 3. The sample period is 
from 1983 to 2010. For ease of interpretation, all variables except dummy have been standardized 
with zero mean and unit standard deviation. All estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 
100 to improve readability. Standard errors are clustered at analyst level and t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Young Analysts 
 Dependent Variables:  
 Forecast Optimism Forecast Accuracy 
 Estimated Coefficients on Recession  
Descriptions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Recession -4.669 -4.807 -4.349 -4.930 -5.039 -4.849 -4.729 -2.895 -2.875 -2.234
 (-3.49) (-3.60) (-3.16) (-3.59) (-3.70) (-3.73) (-3.74) (-2.19) (-2.31) (-1.94)
           
Young analyst -0.590 -1.061 -3.261 -4.302 -4.013 -3.558 -1.212 -1.004 2.669 0.735
   (-0.54) (-0.96) (-2.75) (-3.64) (-3.41) (-3.23) (-1.09) (-0.84) (2.28) (0.66)
           
Recession ×  1.445 1.515 3.270 3.093 3.046 -4.755 -4.766 -6.979 -6.213 -5.361
  Young analyst  (0.71) (0.74) (1.45) (1.35) (1.33) (-2.40) (-2.40) (-3.16) (-2.85) (-2.62)
           
Controls Identical to the corresponding  
columns in Table 5.2 
Identical to the corresponding  
columns Table 5.3 
Num of obs. 56,906  56,906  56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906  56,906  56,906 
Adj.-R2 (%) 1.314 1.372 1.773 5.440 5.838 1.850 2.656 3.131 11.424 22.004
Panel B: General Experience 
Recession -4.014 -4.112 -3.012 -3.717 -3.849 -7.011 -6.944 -6.128 -5.701 -4.664
 (-3.36) (-3.45) (-2.44) (-2.98) (-3.10) (-6.00) (-6.07) (-5.16) (-4.95) (-4.33)
           
General 7.767 8.205 9.487 9.764 9.782 8.187 4.844 5.926 4.312 4.371
  experience  (15.71) (11.08) (12.19) (12.72) (12.72) (15.52) (6.37) (7.49) (5.64) (6.09)
           
Recession ×  -0.379 -0.309 -0.710 -0.501 -0.458 3.731 3.228 3.524 2.887 2.440
  General exprien.  (-0.34) (-0.28) (-0.62) (-0.43) (-0.40) (3.46) (3.00) (3.17) (2.63) (2.38)
           
Controls Identical to the corresponding  
columns in Table 5.2 
Identical to the corresponding  
columns Table 5.3 
Num of obs. 56,906  56,906  56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906  56,906  56,906 





Boom and Recession 
This table reports the panel regression results for boom and recession analysts. The dependent 
variables are Forecast Optimism (columns 1-5) and Forecast Accuracy (columns 6-10), 
respectively. The baseline regressions in Panels A and B are identical to those in Tables 5.2 and 
5.3, respectively. Boom is a dummy takes one when an analyst first appears in IBES during the 
years when the non-negative annual employment growth in analyst labor market is in its top 
tertile, or zero otherwise. Panel C (D) reports the estimated coefficients using regression 
specification 5 (10) in Panel A. The specifications of various robustness checks follow those in 
Table 5.4. Additional details on all variables are summarized in Appendix 3. The sample period is 
from 1983 to 2010. For ease of interpretation, all variables except dummy have been standardized 
with zero mean and unit standard deviation. All estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 
100 to improve readability. Standard errors are clustered at analyst level and t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Boom 
 Dependent Variables:  
 Forecast Optimism Forecast Accuracy 
 Estimated Coefficients on Recession 
Descriptions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Boom 3.098 2.706 3.194 3.193 3.103 4.477 4.337 3.877 3.550 3.456
 (2.81) (2.48) (2.90) (2.89) (2.82) (3.86) (3.93) (3.47) (3.39) (3.54) 
           
Controls/FEs Identical to the corresponding  
columns in Table 5.2 
Identical to the corresponding  
columns Table 5.3 
Num of obs. 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 
Adj.-R2 (%) 0.036 1.341 1.763 5.402 5.799 0.075 2.548 3.051 11.370 21.980
Panel B: Boom and Recession 
Boom 1.995 1.630 2.518 2.297 2.156 2.635 2.604 2.508 2.260 2.473
 (1.71) (1.41) (2.15) (1.96) (1.85) (2.15) (2.24) (2.12) (2.02) (2.37) 
Recession -3.664 -3.593 -2.254 -2.999 -3.172 -6.119 -5.788 -4.570 -4.316 -3.294
 (-2.91) (-2.88) (-1.76) (-2.34) (-2.48) (-4.78) (-4.84) (-3.73) (-3.64) (-2.98) 
           
Controls/FEs Identical to Panel A 
Num of obs. 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 






Table 5.6 – Continued  
Boom and Recession 
















 Estimated Coefficients: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Boom 2.450 3.830 2.060 1.123 2.152 0.598 2.136 1.632 
 (1.90) (2.27) (1.76) (0.92) (1.84) (0.72) (1.83) (1.66) 
Recession -4.265 -3.187 -3.154 -4.345 -2.983 -1.979 -3.002 -3.859 
 (-3.14) (-1.86) (-2.48) (-3.22) (-2.33) (-2.45) (-2.35) (-2.91) 
Controls/FEs Identical to column (5) in Panel B 
Panel D: Robustness Checks on Forecast Accuracy 
Boom 1.083 -1.712 2.395 3.053 2.581 0.333 2.629 0.689 
 (0.93) (-1.21) (2.29) (1.78) (2.47) (0.36) (2.54) (0.37) 
Recession -3.745 -4.337 -3.257 -3.074 -3.236 -2.109 -3.398 -2.232 
 (-3.19) (-2.91) (-2.95) (-1.68) (-2.92) (-2.29) (-3.09) (-2.10) 






This table reports the pooled logistic regression results for recession analysts. The dependent 
variable is Ever-star dummy, which takes one after an analyst is ranked as all-star analyst in 
Institutional Investor magazine. Young analyst is a dummy that takes one during the first three 
years after an analyst appears in IBES. The sample period is from 1983 to 2010. For ease of 
interpretation, all variables except dummy have been standardized with zero mean and unit 
standard deviation. All marginal probabilities have been multiplied by 100 to improve readability. 
Standard errors are clustered at analyst level and z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Recession Analysts 
 Dependent Variable: Ever-Star Dummy 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Recession -2.278 -2.294 -2.364 -2.196 -1.500 
 (-1.93) (-2.12) (-2.23) (-2.23) (-1.70) 
      
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific exp. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
General experience No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of companies No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of industries No No Yes Yes Yes 
Brokerage size No No No Yes Yes 
Days to year-end No No No No Yes 
Firm coverage No No No No Yes 
Underwriting No No No No Yes 
      
Num of obs. 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 
Pseudo-R2 (%) 0.067 14.924 16.067 20.721 24.319 
Panel B: Boom Analysts 
Boom -0.967 -0.434 -0.553 -1.101 -0.829 
 (-0.87) (-0.44) (-0.57) (-1.21) (-1.00) 
  
Controls/FEs Identical to Panel A 
Panel B: Boom and Recession Analysts 
Boom -1.787 -1.216 -1.374 -1.895 -1.376 
 (-1.53) (-1.16) (-1.33) (-1.98) (-1.58) 
Recession -2.861 -2.697 -2.819 -2.817 -1.951 
 (-2.30) (-2.36) (-2.52) (-2.71) (-2.09) 
  







Reconstructing Employment History Panel  
This appendix provides further details on the construction of the panel on employment history. 
The source of the sample of earnings forecasts (1983-2010), price targets (1999-2010), and stock 
recommendations (1993-2010) is the Thomson Reuters’ IBES dataset. For stock 
recommendations and price targets, their sample periods start in 1993 and 1999, respectively, 
when IBES first collects these data. As prior studies suggest that the coverage in the IBES 
database is thin and incomplete prior to 1983, I focus on those analysts who first appear in IBES 
on or after 1983 (O’Brien (1988), Zitzewitz (2001), and Bernhardt, Campello, and Kutsoati 
(2006)). All earnings forecasts used in the study are based on unadjusted earnings forecasts. The 
purpose of doing so is to avoid any potential bias documented in prior studies (e.g. Diether, 
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Payne and Thomas (2003)). Following the literature, the sample 
focuses on the last firm-year forecasts issued by analysts at least 30 days, but not more than one 
year, before the fiscal year-end. All forecasts and recommendations are merged with the Center 
for Research on Security Prices to obtain relevant stock prices.  
Following prior studies, an analyst first starts his or her career in the first month when the 
analyst’s first earnings forecast is recorded in IBES, and an analyst is employed in a brokerage 
house in month t if the analyst issues an earnings forecast under the brokerage house identifier. 
While recommendation data also contain brokerage firm identifiers, I do not use them to 
reconstruct the employment panel for a couple of reasons. First, the recommendation data only 
start in 1993, much later than the starting year of earnings forecast data. Second, analysts are 
more active in initiating or revising earnings forecasts than recommendations. As such, using 
earnings forecasts instead of recommendations tracks analysts’ job separations in a timelier 
manner. The panel on employment history provides information on analysts and their colleagues 





The following summarizes the definitions for the main variables used in this study. 
Variable  Description/Construction Details  
Accuracy  The percentile-rank accuracy following Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) 
and Hong and Kubik (2003). This metric is calculated based on a three-year 
rolling window. Absolute forecast errors that are at the top and bottom 1% are 
excluded before ranking. This metric is further ranked each year and assigned 
a value between 1 (least optimistic) and 100 (most optimistic) to remove 
undue influence of extreme values.  
 
Accuracy Effects is a series of dummies that take one for each decile in 
Accuracy. 
Affiliated dummy A dummy variable that takes the value of one if an analyst works at a 
brokerage house that is either a lead underwriter or a co-underwriter of an 
initial public offering of the covered stock during the past five years or a 
secondary equity offering during the past two years. 
All-star analyst/dummy A dummy indicating whether an analyst is ranked as all-star analyst in the 
previous year’s October issue of the Institutional Investor magazine. 
All-star mentor A dummy indicating whether at least one of the analyst’s mentors has ever 
been ranked as an all-star analyst in the Institutional Investor magazine since 
1983. 
Book-to-market ratio Ratio of book equity to market equity, where book equity is the sum of total 
assets, deferred taxes and convertible debt minus total liabilities and preferred 
stock, and market equity is the product of share price and common shares 
outstanding. 
Brokerage house effects A series of dummies that takes one for an increase of ten in the number of 
analysts who have worked in a brokerage house. 
Brokerage size The number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in the previous 
twelve months. 
Days since last forecast The number of days since the most recent forecast issued by any analyst 
following the firm. 
Days to year-end The average number of days to the forthcoming fiscal year-end.  
 
Days to Year-End Effects is a series of dummies that take one for an increase 
of 30 days before a firm’s fiscal year-end. 
Earnings forecast optimism The percentile-rank optimism following Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) 
and Hong and Kubik (2003). This metric is calculated based on a three-year 
rolling window. Forecast errors that are at the top and bottom 1% are 
excluded before ranking. This metric is further ranked each year and assigned 
a value between 1 (least optimistic) and 100 (most optimistic) to remove 
undue influence of extreme values. 
Firm-specific experience The number of years an analyst covers the firm. 
 
Firm-Specific Experience Effects is a series of dummies that takes one for an 
increase of one year of firm-specific experience of an analyst. 
Firm coverage The average coverage of an analyst’s portfolio of firms.  
 
Firm Coverage Effects are a series of dummies that takes one for an increase 
of one additional analyst in an analyst’s firm coverage. 
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Variable Definitions – Continued 
Variable  Description/Construction Details  
Firm size Natural logarithm of market capitalization of a firm in month t-1. 
Forecast frequency The number of earnings forecasts issued by an analyst in the previous twelve 
months. 
General experience The number of years after an analyst first appears in IBES. 
 
General Experience Effects is a series of dummies that takes one for an increase 
of one year in an analyst’s experience. 
Institutional ownership Fraction of shares held by institutional managers reported in the latest quarterly 
13f filings in Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f) database divided by 
the number of shares outstanding. 
Momentum 6m Cumulative return in the past 6 months ending in month t-1. 
Number of analysts Number of analysts covering a given firm in the previous twelve months prior to 
the earnings forecast date. 
Number of companies The number of companies followed by an analyst in the previous twelve months.  
 
Number of Companies Effects is a series of dummies that takes one for an 
increase of five companies covered by an analyst. 
Number of industries The number of IBES industries followed by an analyst in the previous twelve 
months.  
 
Number of Industries Effects is a series of dummies that takes one for an increase 
of five industries covered by an analyst. 
Optimistic mentors A dummy that takes one when a specific mentor metric is in the top 10% or 20% 
in a given year. Pessimistic mentors dummy is similarly defined and takes one 
when a specific metric is ranked as either in the bottom 10% or 20%. 
Proportion of all-star 
mentors 
The proportion of all-star mentors ever ranked as all-star analysts in prior 
Institutional Investor magazines. 
Price growth optimism The one-year-ahead split-adjusted price target to the split-adjusted stock price on 
announcement date. This metric is ranked each year and assigned a value 
between 1 (least optimistic) and 100 (most optimistic) to remove undue influence 
of extreme values. 
Revision magnitude Difference between an analyst’s current and previous forecast for a given firm in 
given year, divided by the share price two days prior to the forecast 
announcement date. 
Revision signal A discrete variable that takes a value of +1 (-1) when an analyst’s new forecast is 
both above (below) his or her own prior forecast and the prior consensus for the 
firm, and zero otherwise. 
Size-adjusted 
cumulative return 
The size-adjusted cumulative return is the buy-and-hold return of firm j for 
which the revision is made minus the buy-and-hold return for an equal-weighted 





Appendix 2  
Variable Definitions – Continued 
Variable  Description/Construction Details  
Underwriting The proportion of firms affiliated with an analyst’s brokerage firm. A firm is 
affiliated with a brokerage firm if the brokerage firm is either a lead underwriter 
or a co-underwriter of an initial public offering of the covered stock during the 
past five years or a secondary equity offering during the past two years.  
 
Underwriting Effects is a series of dummies that takes one for each decile in 
Underwriting. 
Upgrade jumps The number of large upgrades to the total number of recommendation revisions 
made by an analyst in a given year. A revision is regarded as large if the revision 
in recommendation rating for a given firm is not to its immediately adjacent 
rating category. For instance, an upgrade is large when the rating is upgraded 
from “Sell” to “Buy.” 
 
Upgrade Jumps Dummy is a dummy that takes one when an analyst’s Upgrade 







The following summarizes the definitions for the main variables used in this study. 
Variable  Description/Construction Details  
Analyst Accuracy  The percentile-rank accuracy following Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) 
and Hong and Kubik (2003). This metric is calculated based on a three-year 
rolling window when available. Absolute forecast errors that are at the top 
and bottom 1% are excluded before ranking.  
Analyst optimism The percentile-rank optimism following Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) 
and Hong and Kubik (2003). This metric is calculated based on a three-year 
rolling window when available. Forecast errors that are at the top and 
bottom 1% are excluded before ranking.  
All-star analyst 
dummy 
A dummy indicating whether an analyst is ranked as all-star analyst in the 
previous year’s October issue of the Institutional Investor magazine. 
Brokerage size The number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in the previous 
twelve months. 
Days since last 
forecast 
The number of days since the most recent forecast issued by any analyst 
following the firm. 
Days to year-end The average number of days to the forthcoming fiscal year-end. 
Ever-star analyst dumm A dummy takes one after an analyst is ranked as all-star analyst in prior 
issues of the Institutional Investor magazine.  
Firm-specific experienc The number of years an analyst covers the firm. 
Firm coverage The average coverage of an analyst’s portfolio of firms. 
General experience The number of years after an analyst first appears in IBES. 
Number of analysts Number of analysts covering a given firm in the previous twelve months 
prior to the earnings forecast date. 
Number of companies The number of companies followed by an analyst in the previous twelve 
months. 
Number of industries The number of IBES industries followed by an analyst in the previous 
twelve months. 
Recession A dummy takes one when an analyst first appears in IBES during the years 
when the annual employment growth in analyst labor market is negative 
(i.e., during the years of 1988-91, 2002-03, or 2009-10), or zero otherwise. 
The employment data on Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Investments 
(NAICS: 523 series) are obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Boom A dummy takes one when an analyst first appears in IBES during the years 
when the non-negative annual employment growth in analyst labor market 
is in its top tertile (i.e., during the years of 1984, 1986-1987, 1993-1994, 
1998, or 2000), or zero otherwise. The employment data on Securities, 
Commodity Contracts, and Investments (NAICS: 523 series) are obtained 
from Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Underwriting The proportion of firms affiliated with an analyst’s brokerage firm. A firm is 
affiliated with a brokerage firm if the brokerage firm is either a lead 
underwriter or a co-underwriter of an initial public offering of the covered 
stock during the past five years or a secondary equity offering during the 
past two years. 





The following reports the details of different robustness checks.  
 Dependent Variables:  
 Forecast Optimism Forecast Accuracy 
 Estimated Coefficients on Recession 
Descriptions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
After 1993 -5.050 -5.444 -5.346 -4.961 -5.106 -4.363 -5.307 -5.640 -5.121 -4.117
 (-3.85) (-4.24) (-4.14) (-3.86) (-4.00) (-3.35) (-4.32) (-4.53) (-4.36) (-3.77)
           
Num of obs 42,029  42,029  42,029 42,029 42,029 42,029 42,029 42,029  42,029  42,029 
Adj.-R2 (%) 0.093 2.289 2.421 6.746 7.184 0.067 3.067 3.447 11.855 22.149 
           
After Reg FD -6.021 -4.503 -4.442 -4.323 -4.205 -6.540 -4.936 -4.752 -3.869 -3.883
 (-3.47) (-2.67) (-2.64) (-2.63) (-2.58) (-3.95) (-3.15) (-3.06) (-2.58) (-2.76)
          
Num of obs 24,156  24,156  24,156 24,156 24,156 24,156 24,156 24,156  24,156  24,156 
Adj.-R2 (%) 0.134 3.155 3.333 9.273 9.795 0.158 4.182 5.212 14.159 24.243
          
Left censored -2.709 -3.477 -4.174 -4.712 -4.758 -5.382 -6.667 -6.395 -6.215 -5.503
  at 1984 (-2.27) (-2.92) (-3.40) (-3.83) (-3.88) (-4.42) (-5.80) (-5.39) (-5.49) (-5.23)
           
Num of obs 47,983  47,983  47,983 47,983 47,983 47,983 47,983 47,983  47,983  47,983 
Adj.-R2 (%) 0.027 1.331 1.615 5.355 5.766 0.111 2.429 2.959 10.678 20.999
          
At least 3 years -8.325 -7.435 -6.568 -7.768 -4.768 -9.689 -8.221 -4.958 -4.423 -4.224
  of experience (-4.06) (-3.68) (-3.13) (-3.74) (-3.75) (-4.83) (-4.39) (-2.53) (-2.42) (-2.47)
           
Num of obs 36,238  36,238  36,238 36,238 36,238 36,238 36,238 36,238  36,238  36,238 
Adj.-R2 (%) 0.149 2.305 2.661 7.084 7.553 0.205 3.830 4.768 14.410 24.473
          
Controlling for  -4.307 -3.012 -3.014 -3.715 3.751 -7.131 -5.450 -5.413 -5.008 -4.156
  industry-year FEs (-3.51) (-2.49) (-2.50) (-3.07) (-3.11) (-5.70) (-4.69) (-4.65) (-4.48) (-4.01)
           
Num of obs 56,906  56,906  56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906  56,906  56,906 
Adj.-R2 (%) 0.263 1.790 1.787 5.475 5.848 0.169 2.713 2.961 11.341 22.021
          
Price-scaled -6.375 -6.747 -1.859 -2.114 -2.192 -7.266 -7.844 -1.954 -1.618 -2.228
  dependent var. (-7.79) (-8.32) (-2.50) (-2.75) (-2.90) (-7.38) (-8.40) (-2.24) (-1.76) (-2.59)
           
Num of obs 56,906  56,906  56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906  56,906  56,906 
Adj.-R2 (%) 0.139 1.469 10.193 11.857 14.029 0.167 3.677 13.828 14.866 21.949
           
Non-linear -4.335 -4.391 -3.050 -3.609 -3.762 -7.006 -7.036 -5.717 -5.511 -4.335
  control var. (-3.64) (-3.72) (-2.53) (-2.98) (-3.12) (-5.80) (-6.23) (-4.95) (-4.98) (-4.22)
           
Num of obs 56,906  56,906  56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906  56,906  56,906 
Adj.-R2 (%) 0.065 1.181 1.670 5.336 5.660 0.166 2.732 3.633 11.764 22.049
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Appendix 4 – Continued  
Robustness 
 Dependent Variables:  
 Forecast Optimism Forecast Accuracy 
 Estimated Coefficients on Recession 
Descriptions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
NBER recession 2.019 0.383 -2.725 -3.012 -2.652 2.038 -2.235 -4.553 -5.694 -6.395
 (1.53) (0.30) (-1.99) (-2.19) (-1.93) (1.48) (-1.75) (-3.42) (-4.37) (-5.28)
           
Num of obs 56,906  56,906  56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906  56,906  56,906 
Adj.-R2 (%) 0.011 1.312 1.744 5.388 5.782 0.011 2.491 3.049 11.402 22.033
           
FM regressions -2.608 -4.037 -4.097 -4.194 -3.785 -4.916 -3.640 -3.342 -3.452 -3.450
 (-2.16) (-3.15) (-3.10) (-3.31) (-3.29) (-1.75) (-3.40) (-3.32) (-3.48) (-3.47)
           
#Negative 15 20 19 18 18 16 17 17 18 19 
#Negative+sig. 5 7 6 7 4 11 7 6 5 7 
           
#Positive 8 3 4 5 5 7 6 6 5 4 
#Positive+sig. 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 0 
           
Num of obs 56,906  56,906  56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906 56,906  56,906  56,906 
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